May 26, 2005

A Little Bit of This, a Little Bit of That

Recently, I posted a message on the forum begging for ideas for this FTDOTC column.  Since there were a number of good ideas, and since none seem worthy of a full column all by itself, I've decided to write a little bit about several different topics this month.  For those of us with short attention spans (myself included), this should be right up your alley.

How realistic is DMB?

This is a recurring topic each and every year -- a topic usually brought forth by our favorite "Get a Life" advocate, Billy Baseball.  In addition to this question, Billy also wanted me to write about what the purpose of this league is.  My friend, if you haven't figured that out by now, I'm afraid you never will.

As far as his first question goes, this question arises whenever a player performs out of character for a short period of time -- or even an entire season.  For some reason, people think that a DMB season is supposed to accurately replicate the previous season's numbers to the decimal point.  That simply isn't the case.  If it were, there would be no sense in playing.  We would know what would happen before it happens, removing all fun, challenge and suspense.

DMB allows a certain amount of randomness in order to make the game more unpredictable, and as a result, more compelling.  The company claims that if you simulate 10,000 seasons using the same exact lineups and conditions as in real life, then take the averages from those 10,000 seasons, the simulated numbers and real-life numbers would match with nearly 100% accuracy.

We've only simulated six seasons in the BDBL so far, but that seems like a pretty healthy sample size to me, given that we're talking about over 23,000 games.  So let's take a look at the BDBL totals for the past six seasons (1999-2004) compared to MLB totals (1998-2003):

Now, you have to consider that the BDBL includes six fewer ballparks than MLB, and most BDBL players play in a different ballpark than they did in MLB.  You also have to consider that the BDBL includes six fewer teams than MLB, which basically means that the 150 worst players in MLB don't play in the BDBL.  You also have to consider that, thanks to 20/20 hindsight, BDBL managers can maximize the at-bats and innings of their best players -- often exploiting platoons -- to full advantage.  Finally, you also have to consider that the very best BDBL players will play 10% more than they did in MLB, thanks to our usage rules.

When you consider all of that, those numbers above look pretty damn close, don't they?  The fact that offense plays a larger role in the BDBL than in MLB is somewhat surprising, given that we play in a total non-DH league.  But when you consider that about 90 of those 150 worst players are hitters, while only about 60 are pitchers, it begins to make a bit more sense.

Sorry, Billy, but you'll have to find another excuse for losing 600 games in six years!

Evaluating the Auction Era

Another reader-submitted idea was taking a look at how the auction has changed the BDBL.  In order to get a handle on that idea, we first have to question why the auction was instituted in the first place.  At the time, our purpose was multi-fold: 1) lessen the advantage bad teams get for losing games, 2) ensure that the very best free agents are compensated at market value, and 3) put a stop to the practice of signing the best free agents to one-year-rental contracts.

The latter two criteria have certainly been fulfilled through the advent of free agency.  The question is: Has free agency had any effect on competitive balance?

The problem in doing any sort of hardcore analysis to answer this question is that the sample size is so small, and there are so many other factors involved in a team's success aside from draft position, that the entire exercise is pointless.

For example, there was a positive correlation between 2002 draft order and 2002 wins, which means that teams that drafted earlier were more likely to place higher in the standings that year than teams that drafted later.  Of the five seasons on record (note: the first season's draft order was random, so it doesn't count), this is the only season where a positive correlation exists.

In 2003, we instituted the auction, and there was a negative correlation of -.63 -- the highest negative correlation on record.  This means that teams that drafted lower were more likely to place lower in the standings than in any other year.  Below, I've listed the correlations between draft order for each of the five seasons on record:

Now, you could take this tiny sample size and run with it, deducing that the auction has had a strong affect on competitive balance.  But before you leap to that conclusion, remember that there are many, many other factors involved in a team's success or failure aside from draft order.  Good teams lose players to free agency or trade.  Bad teams gain good, cheap players through dump trades.  Good players sometimes have off years or are injured.  Bad players sometimes come out of nowhere to have an unexpectedly great season.

So, has the auction had any effect on competitive balance?  Hell if I know.

The Incredibly Shrinking Road-Field Advantage

Someone please explain this table to me:

For years, one of the biggest mysteries in the BDBL was why teams played better on the road than at home.  Through the first five seasons, the difference between home and road records wasn't even close; teams played 54 points better on the road.

But all of a sudden, in 2004, things turned around drastically.  Since then, teams are playing 21 points better at home.

Is it possible that the upgrade to version 9 in mid-2004 brought an end to this age-old mystery?

Draft Day Bonanza

In a matter of days, BDBL GM's will begin posting self-congratulatory messages on the forum, indicating how many of "their guys" were chosen in the first round of the MLB amateur draft.  Others (cough, cough, Jim) will begin frantically running their fingers down the list of first-rounders, looking for available free agents for the upcoming free agent pick-up period.

But before we all get too excited, let's consider what it means to be a first-rounder in terms of BDBL performance.  How valuable are these first-rounders?  How many of these guys actually end up contributing to their BDBL teams?  How many become superstars?  And how long does it take for them to contribute?

Guess what?  Time for another table:

Basically, I just added together the VORP for every player selected in the first round (first 30 picks) of the 1995-1999 drafts.  Granted, this isn't a huge sample size (only 150 players total), but I wanted to get a full five-year picture and didn't have the time or energy to include more than five years worth of data.  So while this snapshot isn't definitive, it should give us a pretty good idea of what to expect from a typical pool of first-round draftees.

The most jarring row of data above is the one that says, "# of zeros."  Here, we see that of the 150 players in our little study, 110 of them (73%) had yet to contribute a single VORP point at the Major League level five years after they were drafted.  Needless to say, this number is a lot higher than I expected.  So, of the 30 players chosen in the first round of this June's MLB amateur draft, it is conceivable that 22 of them will turn out to be completely useless turds in the near-term.

Of the players who do contribute at the big league level, their average VORP ranges from 16.5 to 30.1.  In other words, they are about as useful as a modern-day B.J. Surhoff or Juan Rivera.  A VORP in that range has a market value (or Doyle Formula Value) between $2.9m (for hitters on the low end) and $6.3m (for pitchers on the high end), which isn't a bad return on investment.

Of this group of 150 players, 62 turned into what I'll call "useful" players (a VORP of 25 or greater.)  18 turned out to be "stars" (VORP of 50+), and 5 turned into "superstars" (VORP of 75+.)  (Note: I should mention that because J.D. Drew was drafted in the first round twice, he is double-counted here.)

One year after these players were selected in the draft, the player with the highest VORP (Barry Zito at 38.5) had a market value of $8 million.  Two years after the draft, the highest maximum VORP was 52.3 (also Zito) -- a market value of $11m.  At three years, Troy Glaus led the way with a 81.9 VORP and a $14m market value.  At Year+4, Lance Berkman clocked in at 87.3 VORP and $15m in market value.  Finally, in Year 5, Todd Helton owned a VORP of 97.8 and a market value of $17m.

As you can see, there is at least one nugget of gold in each draft, and finding that nugget could save a BDBL team a ton of money in the auction.  But seeing as only ten different players out of a pool of 150 (less than 7%) performed at a "star" level five years after they were drafted, finding those nuggets appear to be about as easy as finding a dime in a room full of nickels.

"Okay, forget about the first round," you say.  "How about just the first ten picks?  Are the odds greater for those guys?"  Glad you asked:

As you can see, the top ten picks comprised 80%, 70%, 72%, 66% and 69% of the total VORP for the top 30 players in the five years of our study.  And 16 of our 18 "stars" (VORP > 50) came from this group of top tens.

Of course, as teams begin to make "budget" picks like Matt Bush, and true #1 picks like Jared Weaver begin to fall into the bottom of the first round thanks to outrageous bonus demands, the numbers will get a bit skewed.  But for the most part, it seems that if a player is among the top ten best players in a draft, chances are about 50/50 that he'll become a major league contributor in five years, 30/70 that he'll become a "useful" player, 12/88 that he'll become a "star", and 4/96 that he'll become a "superstar."

So before you begin to pat yourself on the back too hard on June 7th, keep all of this in mind.

In Retrospect: 2002 Trades

As you all have probably heard far too often by now, I believe trades should be assessed in two ways: 1) how it looks at the time the trade was made, and 2) how it looks in retrospect.  Emperor Tom suggested we take a look back at the trades made in 2002 in order to satisfy the latter criteria.

Before I sat down and began writing this, I didn't realize what a momentous year 2002 was in terms of notorious, significant and fascinating trades.  I wanted to review only five trades, but there were so many noteworthy trades made that year, I expanded it to twelve.  I could have easily written about 25-30 trades made that season.  So let's play along and take a look at those dozen trades with 20/20 hindsight:

Trade #1: Manchester traded Ryan Dempster to Stamford for Chipper Jones.
I don't think we need to say anything more about this trade.  Needless to say it doesn't look any better in retrospect than it did at the time.  But let's try to be fair.  If you remember, Jim's excuse for making this trade was that it was purely a cost-cutting decision.  So let's look at it from that standpoint:

As you can see, Jim's prediction that Jones wouldn't be worth his salary going forward was right on the money.  Chipper's market value has dropped at least $3 million every season since 2002.  Unfortunately, Jim just got the timing wrong.  Had he traded Jones prior to the 2004 season -- as Marazita did -- Jim would have looked downright brilliant.  Instead, he missed out on $9 million in savings.  And he missed out without getting anything of value in return.

Not only did Marazita get that $9m extra to spend on Draft Day for two years straight, but he saved himself $5 million (so far) in added expenses going forward.  And not only did Marazita save himself all that money, but he got far more in return for Jones: Moises Alou, Scott Linebrink, Larry Walker, Greg Myers, Steve Finley, Carlos Guillen and Javier Lopez, to be exact.

Yep, this trade looks every bit as awful in retrospect as it did when it was made.

Trade #2: Stamford traded Nick Johnson, D'Angelo Jimenez and a #2 draft pick to South Carolina for Roger Clemens, Jim Edmonds and two draft picks.
At the time, I killed South Carolina for giving the Cy Young award winner to the defending champions while "throwing in" Jim Edmonds, and getting what I felt was far too little in return.  About a year later, I publicly apologized to Tony and Paul, admitting that I had been wrong about that trade.  Three years later, has my opinion changed yet again?

Well, Stamford certainly got some useful players in that deal.  Clemens went 18-14 with a 4.39 ERA for the Zoots.  And while those numbers were a bit disappointing, those 242 quality innings were a far cry better than replacement-level.  Edmonds, meanwhile, hit .307/.431/.546 for the '02 Zoots, leading the team in runs created (among many other categories.)

Given how those two performed, a contending team like Stamford should have given up quite a lot in return.  So how did those players pan out?

Well, three years later, Nick Johnson has yet to play a full season.  He hit .243/.339/.389 in 329 AB's for the Sea Cats in 2003, then enjoyed a monster half-season (.348/.469/.533 in 336 AB's) in 2004.  So far this year, he is hitting .297/.480/.622 for the Sea Cats, but he has just 37 at-bats in 29 games.

Jimenez is hitting .328/.421/.464 in 192 AB's for the Sea Cats this season.  In 2004, he hit just .269/.357/.396, and he hit just .230/.306/.344 in 2003.

To date, the Sea Cats have gotten 355 runs created out of Johnson and Jimenez for a combined salary of just $4.8 million.  Going forward, Jimenez seems to have lost his MLB job to a Japanese import, but Johnson is hitting better than ever.  If he can stay healthy, he still has two years remaining on his contract.  In other words, the best may still lie ahead.

All things considered, I still maintain the Sea Cats did well on that trade.  Stamford gained two substantial impact players who carried them into the post-season, but South Carolina received two cheap and productive players for many years afterward.  All things considered, that's how trades like that are supposed to work.

Trade #3: Salem traded Eric Milton to Manchester for Todd Helton.
When I heard that Jim Doyle had just traded Chipper Freakin' Jones to the Zoots for Ryan Freakin' Dumpster, my first reaction was, "What on earth is Doyle thinking?!?"  My second reaction was, "I'd better contact him quick before he dumps Helton, too!"

I was pissed when I found out the asking price for Helton was substantially higher than Jones -- or so I thought.  While Dempster was a useless #5 starter in his free agent year, Milton looked like an up-and-coming young lefty ace.  (Similar to a modern-day Cliff Lee, one could say.)  Reluctantly, though, I pulled the trigger.

The rest, as they say, is history.  No need to even look at the numbers.  Helton has been a superstar, both for the Cowtippers and Blazers, while Milton has been one of the biggest disappointments of the past several years.  A big win for Salem (and, by extension, New Milford.)

Trade #4: Los Altos traded Ben Sheets and Christian Guzman to Kentucky for Aaron Sele, Octavio Dotel and Shawon Dunston.
Sometimes those young, up-and-coming stud pitchers turn into Eric Milton.  And sometimes, ever so rarely, they turn into Ben Sheets.

Dotel (9-5, 1.88 ERA, 11 SV's for LAU in 2002) and Dunston (.267/.290/.523 in 176 SUS at-bats) were impact players for the 2002 division champion Undertakers.  But they paid quite a hefty price in Sheets, who has finally developed into an ace starter three years later.

Sheets was later traded to Marlboro at midseason in exchange for Javier Vazquez (who pitched a total of only 34 innings for the Fox.)  And that, of course, began the game of "hot potato" with the Chicago Black Sox that still continues to this day.

It's hard to pick a winner in this one, looking at it in retrospect.  The big winners were the Black Sox, who happened to be sitting in Sheets' chair when the music stopped.

Trade #5: Allentown traded Bartolo Colon, Sean Casey and Jerome Williams to Litchfield for Barry Bonds.
Ah...no wonder why Tom wanted us to take a look back at 2002 trades.  If I had made this trade, I would want to relive it again and again as well.

Let's face it: When you trade the world's greatest living ballplayer, you're never going to get fair value in return.  And Litchfield...poor Litchfield...certainly didn't get fair value here.  In fact, Tom was able to trade for the world's greatest living ballplayer TWICE, and neither time did he trade anything approaching fair value.  And it is no coincidence that he has dominated the Eck League since this trade in 2002.

We all know what happened to Bonds after this trade was made.  He won the 2002 Eck League MVP (his second of four consecutive league MVP awards), then carried the Ridgebacks to the BDBL championship.  The following season, Bonds earned a then-record $16.5 million in the first-ever BDBL free agent auction.  A couple of months later, Mike Stein traded him back to the Ridgebacks for Brad Wilkerson and an expensive load of horse manure.  Predictably, Bonds led the R-Backs to their second consecutive World Series appearance.

As for the Lightning, this trade signaled the beginning of the end of the Litchfield dynasty.  Without Bonds, the Lightning offense fell to 10th in the OL in runs scored.  With former Lightning ace David Cone no longer performing at ace level, Colon was supposed to step in and take his place.  Instead, he posted a 7-17 record with a 5.04 ERA.  The following year, Litchfield passed up the opportunity to trade Colon for B.J. Upton.  And the year after that, Litchfield's new ownership happily unloaded Colon's $10 million salary.

The addition of Casey was supposed to alleviate some of the sting of losing Bonds.  But while Casey hit a respectable .316/.383/.438 in 2002, he was all but useless in 2003 (.262/.343/.339), and by 2004, the Lightning were unloading his contract in the controversial Edmonds trade.

Also included in that trade was Williams, who was once ranked among the top ten prospects in baseball.  He flashed brief brilliance for half a season (though only the Zoots benefited from that), and now he is toiling in Triple-A, trying to figure out what went wrong with his career.

In the discussion of the most lopsided trades in league history, this trade doesn't often get mentioned.  But it belongs right up there.

Trade #6: Akron traded Mark Prior to Chicago for Scott Rolen.
Now here's an interesting trade to look at in retrospect.  At the time, Prior was the top college pitcher in baseball (a modern-day Luke Hochevar, if you will), while Rolen was an up-and-coming young superstar sporting a long-term $10 million-a-year contract.

Which team has fared the best so far?  Let's take a look at MLB VORP:

As you can see, Rolen has nearly doubled Prior's production since this trade: 231.3 VORP points to only 117.1.  However, there's a few columns missing from this table.  Remember, this game is all about maximizing our salary and getting the most bang for our 63.5 million bucks.  So here are the actual BDBL salaries for Rolen and Prior during this timeframe, along with the "Doyle Formula Values", which roughly estimate market value:

Rolen's combined salary for the past four seasons is $40 million, compared to just $1.8 million for Prior.  And while Rolen's combined DFV is $40.5 million, Prior's is $24.5m.  In other words, for $40.5 million, the Ryche could have purchased a similar player to Rolen on the open market.  But Chicago saved $24.5 million by having Mark Prior at the front of their rotation.  And that doesn't even count the difference in savings going forward.

Advantage: Chicago.

Trade #7: Bear Country traded Hideki Matsui and Willie Harris to Gillette for John Burkett.
Oftentimes, when a team is in a position to contend, they will make some reckless decisions.  This trade is a prime example.  In exchange for Burkett (who went 7-3 with a 2.67 ERA in a dozen games down the stretch), Bear Country sacrificed a very cheap, long-term impact player who is currently priced $9.9 million below market value (according to the Doyle Formula.)

The gamble didn't pay off for the Jamboree, who finished in third place that season -- four games behind in the wild card race.  The following year, the Jamboree won the wild card (with no help from Burkett), but lost the OLCS when they hit just .194 as a team.

People often say that trades like this are unrealistic, because they could never happen in real life.  But I think a close MLB parallel to this trade is the Jeff Bagwell-for-Larry Anderson trade in 1990.  At the time, the Red Sox were battling for first place in the AL East.  Anderson pitched 22 innings down the stretch for Boston, posting a 1.23 ERA, and helping the Red Sox win the division by two games.  Of course, Bagwell then went on to have a Hall of Fame career.

Trade #8: Allentown traded Russ Ortiz, Erubiel Durazo, Ron Belliard and Jimmy Anderson to Arizona for Curt Schilling and Eric Gagne.
This is one of the most notorious trades in BDBL history, and I assume there is no need to pick a winner and loser from this deal.  I couldn't possibly write about big 2002 trades without including it.  Amazingly enough, it looks even worse in retrospect than it looked at that time.  On the surface, Ortiz, Durazo and Belliard had some pretty good years after this trade was made.  But what must be remembered is that Ortiz was pitching with a very expensive, long-term contract that made him all-but-untradeable, Durazo was a free agent the following year, and Belliard was so awful at that time that he was released with a penalty soon thereafter.  Meanwhile, the "throw-in", Gagne, turned into the best reliever in baseball.  God, what an awful, awful trade.

Trade #9: Atlanta traded Ken Griffey, Jr. and Wily Mo Pena to Villanova for Juan Pierre and Scott Schoeneweis.
Speaking of awful trades, Gene Patterson has been involved in many awful trades through the years.  Most of the time, he has benefited from these awful trades by dumping contracts that no one in his right mind would ever want.  This trade is a prime example.

Like the Jamboree in the Matsui trade above, the Mustangs were looking to add an impact player for a run at the wild card.  And like the Jamboree, the Mustangs fell considerably short of that goal, missing the wild card by 12 games.  Unlike the Jamboree, Villanova's sacrifice was not in long-term impact prospects (though Pierre and Schoeneweis turned out pretty well), but in taking on a massive, burdensome contract.  According to the Doyle Formula, Griffey cost the Mustangs $8.5 million in 2003 and $6.4 million in 2004.  And in 2005, Villanova sacrificed a shot at the playoffs in order to unload that contract.

Trade #10: Atlanta traded Mike Hampton to New Milford for Doug Mientkiewicz.
Hard to believe, but the Griffey trade wasn't even Gene Patterson's crowning achievement in 2002.  No, that honor goes to this deal, in which the Fire Ants unloaded perhaps the worst contract ever assigned in BDBL history.

Unlike the Jamboree and Mustangs, the Blazers were not in a position to compete for a playoff spot at the time of this trade.  New Milford finished the 2002 season with a record of 49-111 -- SIXTY-FIVE GAMES out of first place.  So why on earth did they see a need to trade for a pitcher like Hampton?  Only Billy Baseball knows.

According to the Doyle Formula, Hampton cost the Blazers $5 million in 2003 (Note: Hampton owned a VORP of -25.8 in MLB 2002, so in actuality, the difference between his Doyle Value of -4.9 and his actual salary of $8m was $12.9m.)  He was $3.9 million overpriced in 2004, and is $5.4m overpriced in 2005.  In total, then, he has cost the Blazers $14.2 million over the past three years -- and he still has two years remaining on his contract!

How Gene Patterson didn't win the EL GM of the Year award that year is an absolute mystery.

Trade #11: Salem traded Bobby Brownlie to Marlboro for Jamie Moyer.
Here's another notorious trade that is still generating posts on the BDBL forum three years after it was made.  At the time, Brownlie was the consensus best college pitcher in baseball, pitching for Sharky's hometown Rutgers University team.  Moyer was a 20-game-winner in MLB '01, but just days after this trade was made, he was shipped off to the Bear Country Jamboree in exchange for reliever Chad Fox.

Obviously, this trade doesn't look very good in retrospect.  Brownlie injured his shoulder shortly after this trade occurred.  That injury led to flawed mechanics, which led to further injuries, which led to a drop in his draft stock, which led to a disappointing start to his pro career.  Three years later, he has yet to pitch in a big league game, and he's currently sporting an ERA of 4.98 for the Triple-A Iowa Cubs.

Sometimes, when you trade a proven commodity for a top college pitcher, it works out.  (See the Chicago/Akron trade above.)  And sometimes -- such as in this example -- it does not.  That's why they call these types of trades, "high-risk/high-reward."

Trade #12: Cleveland traded Joel Piniero, Roy Halladay, Josh Paul and Brian Hunter to Southern Cal for Jon Lieber, Matt Lawton, Trevor Hoffman and J.T. Snow.
There are a ton of other candidates to highlight, but we only have so much disk space.  For example, the Kansas Law Dogs made a ton of white-flag trades that are interesting in that the 'Dogs were still very much in the thick of a pennant race at the time those trades were made.  But this Cleveland trade is more interesting to me, given the fact that it's not the first time Mike Stein sacrificed a good, young player (or two) for immediate impact.

At the time, the Rocks were battling for a Hrbek Division title that no one seemed to want to win.  In the end, the Akron Ryche ended up winning the division with a paltry record of just 81-79 -- the worst record by a BDBL playoff team in league history.

Lieber went 8-7 for the Rocks, with a 4.04 ERA in 156 innings.  Lawton hit .280/.379/.426 through 507 at-bats.  Hoffman posted a 2.98 ERA through 57.1 innings while setting up for Robb Nen.  And Snow had just one at-bat before he was traded to Kansas.  All four, then, contributed greatly to Cleveland's drive toward the post-season.  Yet even with their contributions, the Rocks fell short of their goal.

All of which made the sacrifice in this trade even greater.  The following season, Halladay was a Cy Young-caliber pitcher.  Two years later, Piniero blossomed into one of the many aces of the SoCal pitching staff, going 17-1 with a 3.07 ERA.