July 29, 2005

Case Study: 2005 New Milford Blazers

In case you haven't heard, the New Milford Blazers packed up their bags, waved the white flag, threw in the towel and took their ball and went home.  At the time of their big announcement, they were just five games behind in the wild card race.  Since their big announcement, they have traded away Todd Helton, Melvin Mora, Brad Lidge, Tom Gordon, Aki Otsuka, Juan Pierre, Orlando Hernandez, Mike Hampton and every other impact player that wasn't nailed to the floor.

I'm not going to discuss whether or not the Blazers should have made that decision.  I'm also not going to analyze the trades that were made and whether or not New Milford got enough value in return.  (That has certainly been covered in depth on the forum already.)The purpose of this case study is to examine the root cause of New Milford's decision.  Namely, how did such a seemingly talented team own a .500 record?  Was their performance expected, or were there contributing factors?  By examining these questions, hopefully we can learn a little something about our own teams and avoid a similar fate in the future.

Expectations

After losing 601 games over the previous six seasons, the Blazers came into the 2005 season looking like a championship contender.  With a high-powered offensive core led by Todd Helton, Melvin Mora and Alfonso Soriano, and a capable pitching staff led by the dominant bullpen duo of Tom Gordon and Akinori Otsuka, the Blazers were predicted to finish in second place in the Butler Division by both league polling and the FTDOTC preseason preview.

The Blazers had every right to be optimistic about their team's chances heading into the season.  Without going into boring detail, an analysis of their preseason roster predicts totals (in a neutral ballpark) of 769 runs scored and 581 runs allowed.  Using the infamous "Pythagorean theory," that would give the Blazers a 100-60 record on the season.  Certainly cause for optimism.

But after an 18-10 start to the season, the Blazers fell into second place by the Ides of March.  Since that first chapter, they are just 34-42 -- the worst record in their division.

Winter, 2005

Heading into the winter of 2005, the Blazers carried an impressive group of keepers.  In the October issue of FTDOTC, it was revealed that the Blazers owned the highest total VORP of any team in the league at that time.  And in the (unofficial) pre-winter BDBL Power Rankings, the Blazers were ranked #6 in the league.

New Milford carried over nearly a full roster of players from the previous year, including a full infield, two outfielders, five starting pitchers and six relievers.  In total, they kept 23 players with a total of $44.8 million in salary.  That left $17.5 million to spend on a dozen free agents.

The only glaring weakness on the Blazers roster at that time was the absence of a true #1 starter, and some quality innings in their starting rotation.  Rookie Zach Greinke (3.85 CERA in 145 IP) was the team's de facto ace, although he would only have 159 innings of usage.  Greinke was backed by Mike Hampton (4.76 CERA in 172+ IP), Jose Lima (4.18 CERA in 170+ IP) and Vicente Padilla (4.42 CERA in 115+ IP.)

This problem, however, was not addressed during the off-season, as the Blazers sat out while several big-name starting pitchers changed uniforms before the deadline.  Instead, New Milford sat on the sidelines and watched as their rivals loaded up.

The Auction

The Blazers pursued several starting pitchers in the auction, bidding $6 million on Tom Glavine, $6m on Brad Penny, $5.5m on Bobby Madritsch, $6m on Chris Carpenter and $1m on Jon Lieber.  Each bid fell short; in some cases, far short.  In the end, they ended up with the winning bid for just one player: Orlando Hernandez at $4.5 million.

While Hernandez was -- inning for inning -- one of the best pitchers in the auction, he only pitched a total of 84 2/3 MLB innings, giving him just 93 innings of BDBL usage.  Hernandez would only be available for about 13 starts (or about two chapters.)  And even if the Blazers were to make it to the playoffs, Hernandez would only be eligible to pitch six innings per series.

Of the six starters on the Blazers roster at this point, only two of them (Hampton and Lima) had pitched more than 150 innings in MLB, and none of them pitched more than 175 innings.  You've heard of a bullpen-by-committee?  The Blazers were attempting to get by with a rotation-by-committee.

In total, the six Blazers starters combined for 748 MLB innings, which amounts to 823 innings of BDBL usage.  If you figure seven innings per start, that gave them just 117 starts before their usage would be completely drained.  The Blazers left the auction table with $13 million still available to spend.  Clearly, the bulk of that money needed to be spent on a starting pitcher in the draft.

The Draft

By the time New Milford's first pick in the draft came around, however, most of the top starting pitchers were gone.  The three best choices for starting pitchers at that point were Jarrod Washburn, Steve Trachsel and Paul Byrd.  Despite the 230-inning hole in their starting rotation, however, the Blazers used their first pick in the draft to plug a hole in their outfield with Shannon Stewart -- an offensive asset, but an asset that was limited to just 416 at-bats.

At this point, the Blazers had a full roster of players, including a full infield and outfield, a full bullpen and bench, and enough starting pitching to get them through a couple of chapters.  It is assumed that their strategy at this point was to pick up as many players as possible to use as trade bait during the season to secure a much-needed quality innings-eating starting pitcher.  And with their second pick of the draft, the Blazers selected just such a player: Rick Ankiel.  At the time, New Milford believed that Ankiel (who cost this team $3 million) was on the road to recovery and would fetch a sizeable return on the open market.  Unfortunately, New Milford's brain trust severely underestimated the market value of a $3 million pitcher recovering from a serious case of Steve Blass disease.  Ankiel's trade value plummeted to zero by the second week of March.

Curiously, their next four picks (Jeff Conine, Doug Mirabelli, Carlos Almanzar and Jose Offerman) carried little-to-no trade value whatsoever, and served merely as bench players throughout the season.  The Blazers then closed out the draft by selecting five $100,000 picks they felt would be valuable trade bait: Gustavo Chacin, Mike Gosling, Carmen Cali, Jose Bautista and Justin Lehr.  Of the five, only Chacin lived up to that role.

Midseason trades (pre-firesale)

Perhaps New Milford's greatest trade chit was their #1 farm pick, Chad Orvella.  Another member of the farm, Chuck James, had gotten off to a blistering start in the minor leagues, and their $100,000 flier Chacin enjoyed a tremendous spring, and a productive April, raising his trade value as well.

Prior to the Chapter Three deadline, New Milford traded all three players, plus youngsters Mike Cuddyer and Denny Bautista.  Those five players represented their greatest trading assets on the open market.  But rather than receiving a genuine #1 starter in return, the Blazers received a third closer (Brad Lidge), another short-innings starter (Wade Miller) and a couple of bench players (Rich Aurilia and Kevin Mench.)  In short, New Milford's most pressing need wasn't filled, and they had little left to trade in order to fill that need.

A chapter later, the Blazers added yet another reliever, Kent Mercker.

Finally, at long last, New Milford added a solid, quality, innings-eating starting pitcher in Woody Williams.  In that June 30th trade, the Blazers added Williams and Juan Pierre in exchange for Stewart and Horacio Ramirez.  But just four days later -- before Williams even had a chance to throw one pitch as a Blazer -- New Milford threw in the towel and began unloading all of their players to the highest bidder.

Ballpark Factors

New Milford's home ballpark model, Citizen's Bank, is a home run hitter's haven, with factors of 117 for left-handers and 111 for right-handers.  Given that, you would expect actual run scoring to be a little higher than the team's predicted run totals -- and indeed, it has been.  The problem is that New Milford's hitters are only scoring about 7% more runs than expected, while New Milford's pitchers are allowing a whopping 30% more runs than expected.

How could this be?  Shouldn't a ballpark have the same effects on hitters as it does on pitchers?  Let's take a closer look at those home/road splits:

Blazers batters at home: .275/.341/.429 in 1,644 AB, 4.65 runs/game
Blazers batters on road: .277/.341/.446 in 1,858 AB, 5.60 runs/game

Blazers pitchers at home: .266/.338/.461 in 1,727 AB, 5.48 runs/game
Blazers pitchers on road: .240/.317/.380 in 1,706 AB, 4.06 runs/game

Blazers hitters are actually hitting nearly a full run better on the road!  And Blazers pitchers are pitching over a full run worse at home!  Again, how could this be??

Let's dig even deeper:

New Milford's home ballpark runs factor (which I lifted from the Bill James Handbook) is 109.  Of the seven pitchers on the Blazers' staff from more pitcher-friendly MLB parks, six of them own a home OPS greater than their MLB OPS -- which is exactly what you'd expect.  And of the three pitchers whose MLB parks are more (or equally) hitter-friendly than New Milford's home park, only one (Hernandez) has a lower home OPS.

Of course, part of the problem here is small sample size.  Using Padilla as an example, if he had thrown just one six-hit, no-walk shutout at home, his OPS would fall from 922 to 835 (which is close to his MLB OPS.)

Putting aside the small samples, you can see that, as a whole, the Blazers pitching staff is comprised mostly of pitchers from pitcher-friendly MLB ballparks (in comparison to the Blazers' pitcher-unfriendly park.)  So their home/road splits shouldn't be all that surprising.  Granted, this shouldn't translate into a 30-percent difference!  But it explains around 10% of that difference.

How, then, do we explain the hitters?  Again, let's dive a little deeper:

Here, six hitters are from more pitcher-friendly parks than New Milford's, so you would expect all six to perform better at home.  In fact, only two of them (Stewart and DaVanon) are thriving at Nestle Field.  Of the three hitters from more hitter-friendly MLB parks, all three are performing below their MLB standards, as expected.

The result is a record of 21-27 at home and 29-23 on the road.

How could this be?  How could New Milford hitters be underperforming despite playing half their games in a hitter's park?  Read on.

Usage

One of the most overlooked aspects of managing a ballclub is usage.  Knowing when to play a certain player can make a big difference in the outcome of the events on the field.  One lingering question from the above section is: Why the hell is Randy Winn batting so poorly at home?  The answer to that question may be found in the way he has been used this season.

Winn ranks #2 on the Blazers with 129 at-bats against left-handed pitchers this season.  This, despite the fact that he can't hit left-handers (.257/.316/.366 in MLB, .264/.336/.419 in BDBL) very well.  In MLB, 30.5% of his at-bats came against lefty pitchers.  In the BDBL, 33.4% of his AB's have been against southpaws.

This usage pattern is not a fluke.  In fact, the Blazers lead the entire Ozzie League in at-bats against left-handed pitchers.  Not coincidentally, the Blazers are also among the worst-hitting teams in the OL against left-handers, with a .242/.322/.410 average as a team.  Conversely, New Milford's OPS against righties is a whopping 69 OPS points higher.

It's no wonder that teams are loading up with left-handed pitchers against the Blazers.  The only wonders are: a) why the Blazers' GM didn't go out and get some hitters that can hit lefty pitching, and b) why the Blazers' manager continued to plug in players like Winn full-time against lefty pitching.

Winn's home/road splits, then, could be attributed to the fact that he faced a greater proportion of lefties at home than he did on the road.  This theory isn't easily verifiable (due to an error in BASE), but it's one plausible explanation, nevertheless.

Another element of usage is knowing how and when to use your best starting pitchers.  Because the Blazers owned so many part-time starters, it would have been to their advantage to max-out the innings for all of their best starters early in the season, then back-fill those innings later in the season with pitchers acquired through trade.

New Milford's #1 starter, Greinke, was nearly maxed out through the first two chapters, making 12 starts while racking up 72 of his available 159 innings (45% of his usage.)  Their #2 pitcher (Hernandez), however, was given just five starts for a total of 26 innings through the first two chapters.  In place of Hernandez, New Milford handed the ball to pitchers like Lima (5.98 ERA in 12 starts through the first two chapters), Hampton (4.71 ERA through 12 starts) and Padilla (4.29 ERA through 11 starts.)  Despite the ineffectiveness of three-fifths of their starting rotation, the Blazers pitching staff sported a 3.93 ERA through Chapter Two.  Since then, their team ERA is 4.73.

Hernandez racked up just 20.2 innings (in three starts) during this time (compiling an ERA of 2.61.)  Why was he rotting away on the bench while these pitchers got hammered again and again?  What were the Blazers saving him for?  Another short-innings starter, Wade Miller, was given just four starts.  He, too, could have been a more useful replacement.

Finally, another element of usage is knowing when (and for how long) to use your relievers.  If you put your relievers in a position of failure, they will (most likely) fail.  If you use a LOOGY consistently against righties, for example, his BDBL numbers will look much worse than his MLB numbers.

For example, in a Chapter One series against Sylmar this year, Tom Gordon threw 28 pitches in the first three games of the series.  New Milford then brought him into the Game Four to pitch his fourth game in a row, and allowed him to throw 36 pitches.  Despite being set up to fail, he pitched brilliantly, tossing two shutout innings.  In another series against Salem, Gordon threw 56 pitches.  Again, he succeeded despite the odds against him.  On another occasion, however, the odds caught up to him.  In a Chapter Three series against Los Altos, Gordon was allowed to throw 34 pitches, just a day after throwing 15.  He served up a two-run double with two outs in the ninth, and the Undertakers won by one run.

Aki Otsuka's usage pattern is similar.  In fact, all of the Blazers relievers perform far better when throwing a reasonable number of pitches.  Take a look at this table, which shows ERA grouped by number of pitches:

"Luck"

As of this writing, New Milford has outscored their opposition by 40 runs this season.  Of the teams in the Ozzie League, only the Cowtippers (+181) and Infidels (+51) have outscored their opposition by more runs than the Blazers.  New Milford's Pythagorian record is 54-46 -- four games better than their actual record, due in part to a 9-16 record in one-run games.  Of the 30 teams in the BDBL, only the Manchester Irish Rebels and Kansas Law Dogs have a worse record in one-run games (as compared to their overall records.)  In fact, if you removed all one-run games from their record, the Blazers would own the sixth-best record in the BDBL.

When a team underperforms so drastically in one-run games, it is usually caused by a mixture of poor clutch performance, bad relief pitching, and bad in-game strategic decision-making.

Are the Blazers hitters performing poorly in the clutch?  Let's take a look:

Overall: .276/.341/.438
Innings 7-9: .287/.348/.445
Extra innings: .186/.308/.465
Runners on base: .267/.341/.424
Runners in scoring position: .267/.343/.433
Bases loaded: .351/.394/.595
Runners on base, two outs: .240/.325/.398
RISP, two outs: .245/.333/.417

For the most part, New Milford is hitting as well (or better) in "clutch" situations as they are overall.  Although they seem to have trouble hitting in extra innings, the Blazers are a respectable 4-5 in extra-inning games, so that's not a big problem.

How about relief pitching?  Has that been a problem?

Starters: 4.28 ERA in 545 IP
Relievers: 4.28 ERA in 349 IP

Nope, no problem there.  So, that leaves us with managerial decision-making.

Managing

Let's take a typical Blazers series at random.  In a four-game set this chapter, the Blazers took on the Silicon Valley CyberSox at home.  They lost all four games -- two by one run.  Let's break down some of the managerial decisions made in each of those games to see if we can discover why the Blazers lose so many one-run games, and why they may be underperforming at home.

Game One
The Game One match-up featured Mike Hampton against Odalis Perez.  With a lefty on the hill for the CySox, New Milford went with a lineup that featured Randy Winn in the leadoff spot.  Right away, we see a problem, as Winn's OBP (.316 in MLB, .336 in BDBL) is hardly indicative of a quality leadoff batter.  Meanwhile, Kevin Mench -- a .319/.390/.646 hitter against lefties and a "Fr" center fielder -- rode the bench.  If nothing else, Winn should at least bat at the bottom of the lineup against lefties.  Instead, he's an automatic out at the top of the lineup.

A Doug Mirabelli homer in the second inning put New Milford ahead, and a Mirabelli sac fly in the fourth made it 2-0, New Milford.  In the fifth, Marquis Grissom connected for a leadoff homer, and Lou Merloni and Mike Lieberthal followed with a walk and a base hit.

At this point, New Milford was leading by a score of 2-1.  There were runners at first and second and the #8 hitter for Silicon Valley was stepping to the plate.  Hampton had thrown 57 pitches at this point.  For reasons beyond explanation, New Milford pulled Hampton from the game and inserted Duaner Sanchez.

The only time you should ever pull your starting pitcher in the fifth inning is if he's: a) hurt, or b) getting killed.  Hampton had allowed a couple of hits and a walk, but he was hardly getting killed.  And with the #8 and #9 hitters due up, he could have easily escaped from the inning and saved the bullpen some wear and tear.

Sanchez K'ed the #8 hitter, then got the #9 hitter (Perez) to ground into a force-out at home (presumably on a failed squeeze play.)  With two outs, Orlando Hudson came to the plate.  Hudson (a switch hitter) hits a little better against righties (like Sanchez) than lefties (like Hampton.)  And Sanchez does a bit better against righties than lefties.  Not surprisingly, then, Hudson singled, scoring the tying run.

Milton Bradley (another switch-hitter) singled as well, scoring the go-ahead run.  That brought Carlos Lee to the plate.

Lee's MLB numbers: .308/.385/.551 vs. LH, .303/.359/.515 vs. RH

New Milford stuck with the righty Sanchez, right?  Wrong.  They promptly summoned a lefty, Horacio Ramirez, who coughed up a three-run blast to Lee.  Game over.  New Milford lost 6-3.

Game Two
The match-up: Zach Greinke for New Milford against Chris Carpenter of Silicon Valley.  Already a game in the hole, and facing a team that is one of the best in the Ozzie League, New Milford should have their best team in the field this game.  Instead, they chose to sit Shannon Stewart (.325/.391/.475 vs. RH), presumably for usage reasons.  Taking his place is Jeff Conine (.282/.331/.415) -- a far inferior hitter.  But rather than bury him at the bottom of the lineup, Conine batted fifth and went 0-for-3.

Also absent from the starting lineup is Jeff DaVanon (.289/.383/.441 vs. RH), Luis A. Gonzalez (.302/.344/.480 vs. RH) and Jose Offerman (.289/.390/.463).

But the most bizarre part of the Blazers lineup is that Kevin Mench -- a .259/.306/.486 hitter against righties -- is batting THIRD.  Someone please explain that one to me!

The Blazers were leading 1-0 in the fourth when Silicon Valley strung together a couple of runs on a pair of base hits and a two-run double.  With one out, the bases loaded, and Carpenter stepping to the plate, he either hit or bunted a ball to the first baseman -- who apparently wasn't drawn in.  The force is made at first and a third run scores.

With the opposing team's ace on the hill, a manager should do everything possible to keep the other team from scoring, as you have to expect a low-scoring game.  If the corners weren't playing in in that situation, they damn well should have been.

The CyberSox scored two more in the sixth and another in the eighth, making it a 6-1 game.  Duaner Sanchez, who was brought into the game in the sixth inning, is still out there in the eighth when Hee Seop Choi leads off the inning with a home run.  The question then becomes: Why is Sanchez still out there, when Brad Lidge, Tom Gordon and Aki Otsuka are all available?

In any event, the Blazers managed to score two runs in the bottom of the eighth on three singles and a fielder's choice.  Silicon Valley closer Keith Foulke then entered the game to shut it out, but Melvin Mora had a different idea, as he connected for a two-run blast, making it a one-run game.

In the ninth, Soriano grounded out for the first out, bringing David Eckstein to the plate.  At this point, New Milford could turn to Stewart, DaVanon or Offerman to pinch hit for the puny-hitting Eckstein.  (Note: Mark Sweeney, who hit .250/.366/.476 vs. RH's is on the inactive roster, as he's only received one at-bat all season.)  Instead, the Blazers stuck with the Eckstein, who predictably flied out for out number two.

Now, one out away from the end of the game, New Milford finally called upon their $5m preseason acquisition Shannon Stewart, who tripled into the gap, putting the tying run 90 feet away.

This brought Winn to the plate -- a .299/.359/.453 hitter against right-handers, and a good singles-hitting contact hitter.  Exactly the type of guy you want at the plate in a situation like this.  Foulke eats up left-handed hitters, but unless you've got a good right-handed hitter who nails righties on the bench (and there aren't too many of those), you couldn't ask for a better guy to be at the plate.

Yet, contrary to all logic and reason, New Milford brought Mike Lamb to the plate to pinch hit.  Lamb, a left-handed batter, hit .277/.345/.498 in MLB, so he's not a bad choice as a pinch hitter in general.  But in this situation??  With a good left-handed singles-hitter already at the plate in Randy Winn??  With the tying run at third base and two outs??  Lamb is a free-swinging power hitter (14 HR in 278 AB, with 63 K's) -- exactly the type of hitter Keith Foulke eats for breakfast.  The Blazers didn't need a home run at this point; just a single.

Lamb lined out to the shortstop, ending the game at 6-5.

Game Three
Pitching match-up: Vicente Padilla vs. Ryan Drese.  With two losses already on the board, New Milford desperately needed to salvage a split of this series.  Once again, their best lineup should be on the field.  Instead, Stewart sat once again.  For the second game in a row, Mench batted third, between Helton and Mora, while Conine hit fifth.

After two scoreless innings, the CyberSox jumped ahead on an RBI triple in the third.  The next inning, Silicon Valley puts two runners on base via an error and a single.  Milton Bradley then singled, scoring the runner from second.  The throw from right field was allowed to go to the plate, allowing Bradley to advance to second.

With two outs in the inning, New Milford once again went to the bullpen extremely early.  Despite throwing just 54 pitches, Padilla was yanked from the game, and Kent Mercker was inserted to face lefty Laynce Nix.  Predictably, Silicon Valley pinch hit with Marquis Grissom (a lefty-killer), who singled home two runs (including Bradley from second base.)

By going to their bullpen in the fourth inning, New Milford once again was needlessly overtaxing their bullpen.  New Milford's starters had a total of only 13.1 innings in the first three games -- an average of about 4 1/3 innings each.  Mercker was allowed to throw a whopping 39 pitches through three-plus innings, yet amazingly, he didn't give up another run the rest of the way.

The Blazers scored a run in the sixth, and another in the seventh, to make it a 4-2 game in favor of the CySox.  Brad Lidge, who had thrown 21 pitches in Game Two, then came in to face the top of the Silicon Valley lineup in the eighth.  With two outs, Bradley connected for a three-run homer.

Thanks to Mench (a ground-out with a runner on second) and Conine (an inning-ending double play with a runner on third), New Milford failed to score in the bottom of the eighth.

In the top of the ninth, New Milford did one of the most unusual things I've ever seen: they intentionally walked the leadoff batter.  Who was this batter?  Barry Bonds?  Nope.  Albert Pujols?  Nope.  It was Mike Lieberthal.  Aki Otsuka then came in to face Grissom, who deposited Otsuka's second pitch into the bleachers for a two-run homer.

Why give your opponent a free baserunner, leading off an inning, when you're losing by five runs in the ninth?  Only Billy knows.

Final score: 9-2 CyberSox.

Game Four
Pitching match-up: El Duque Hernandez for New Milford against Carlos Silva.  Once again, Mench batted third, with Conine batting fifth and Pierzynski batting sixth in front of Alfonso Soriano.  Silva is a particularly platoon-vulnerable pitcher, who allows an 870 OPS against lefties while holding righties to an OPS of just 726.  Yet DaVanon, Lamb, Offerman and Sweeney all sit this one out as well.  As expected, Conine and Mench go 1-for-7 combined.

A Ben Broussard homer in the second inning gave Silicon Valley the lead.  Hernandez and Silva then threw nothing but bullets the rest of the way.  The two pitchers allowed just three hits and no walks combined through the next six innings.

With two outs in the eighth, Hernandez walked the #8 hitter, Hudson, and after 115 pitches, he got the hook.  Otsuka came in to face pinch hitter Hee Seop Choi, and he walked, putting a runner at second.  After throwing just six pitches, Otsuka was pulled in favor of Tom Gordon, who gave up an infield single, but got out of the bases-loaded jam with a fly ball out.

In the bottom of the eighth, Eckstein was once again allowed to hit for himself, with the tying run on third.  Once again, he failed, lining out to short.  That brought Gordon to the plate.  Had the Blazers done a double-switch, or had they allowed Otsuka to record the final out of the eighth, Gordon would not be required to bat.  But here he was, batting with the game on the line, with one out and the tying run at third.

At this point, New Milford had two viable options: 1) Bring in a pinch hitter to get the runner on third home, and bring in Lidge for the ninth, 2) Let Gordon swing away and hope for a long fly ball to the outfield or slow ground ball to the infield.

Instead, New Milford chose option #3 and attempted a suicide squeeze.  Gordon popped it up, doubling off the runner at third to end the inning.

Gordon was effectively wild in the ninth, sandwiching three strikeouts around a hit batter, a walk and a run-scoring single, increasing the CyberSox lead to 2-0.

Fortunately for the Blazers, Silicon Valley's closer, Foulke, is just as wild as Gordon.  Three singles and a sac fly plated two runs for the Blazers, forcing extra innings.

With 32 pitches under his belt, Gordon was allowed to start the tenth.  Pinch hitter Clint Barmes doubled off the weary Gordon, bringing Romaniello out of the dugout once again.  But with the go-ahead run standing on second base, no outs, and the top of the Silicon Valley lineup due up, Billy summoned Duaner Sanchez while Brad Lidge sat in the bullpen and watched in incredulous silence.

After a ground ball pushed Barmes to third, the go-ahead run now stood 90 feet away, with one out, and the #2 hitter approaching the plate.  It is hard to tell from the box score what happened next, but it appears that a ground ball was hit somewhere in the infield.  The runner on third went home, and the throw home was late.  In that situation, bringing the infield in would be a no-brainer.  One presumes, then, that the infield was drawn in.  But then again, judging by the decisions made throughout this series, one shouldn't presume anything.

In the bottom of the tenth, Eckstein was once again allowed to bat for himself.  Once again, to the surprise of no one (except, perhaps, Billy), he failed.  With the pitcher due up, New Milford pinch hit, calling upon Luis A. Gonzalez.  All things considered, it wasn't the worst choice they could have made.  But Gonzalez flied out to end the game nonetheless.

There you have it.  Four easily winnable games.  With the right managerial decisions, New Milford could have easily won three of those games.  Instead, they were swept, to no one's fault but their own.

Conclusion

Every time the Blazers lose, they blame "the game."  They've been blaming the game for seven years now.  The game is solely responsible for 651 losses (and counting.)  "This game sucks" has become New Milford's second-favorite mantra (right behind "Get a life.")  But as I've shown, it's not the game's fault.  The Blazers have no one to blame for their failures but themselves.

On the GM side, the Blazers did nothing all winter, and nothing throughout the first three chapters, to strengthen their two main weaknesses: starting pitching and their hitting against left-handed pitching.  They used their best trade bait to secure unnecessary bench players and relievers, and they spent the bulk of their Draft Day money on players that did little to improve the team.

On the managerial side, the Blazers failed to utilize their best players at the best possible times.  Their best starter sat out most of the first four chapters, and their best relievers were placed in positions to fail.  Their lineups were constructed illogically, with no thought as to platoon advantages or opponent strengths.  Some of their best hitters sat the bench against some of the top teams in the league.  And their in-game strategic decisions put their players in a position of vulnerability and weakness, with little chance of success.

Did the Blazers also suffer a bit of bad luck?  Sure.  It seems that every year, one or two players in the league underperform badly in relation to their MLB numbers.  This year, Alfonso Soriano is certainly one of those players.  Aki Otsuka may be as well, though after you consider ballpark and usage factors, his performance hasn't been that far off the mark.  But luck is often a byproduct of design.  And over the course of seven full seasons, luck plays virtually no role at all.

Despite all of the obstacles the Blazers faced, despite all of their inept decision-making, they were still in a position to compete right up until their knee-jerk, white-flag-waving frenzy.  They are just seven games out of the wild card race as I type, and the teams they are chasing are hardly unbeatable.  New Milford's luck could have easily reversed itself over the final two chapters.  Better yet, New Milford could have easily created their own luck by trading for an impact player or two and managing their players a bit more wisely.

Instead, the Blazers have folded their tents once again.  They've sold off all of their best players and are focusing once again on the elusive "next year."  The rebuilding process has begun once again.  The question is: Will the Blazers have a better shot at winning in 2006 than they have right now?  That question remains to be answered.  The 2005 Blazers were good enough to compete, yet they failed due to incompetent leadership.  Who's to say that the 2006 Blazers -- no matter how improved they may be -- will perform any better under the same leadership?

Flags fly forever.  But there's always a next year.