April, 2007
Making
the Case for Early Dumping
Between
the 1580's and the 1980's, the "devil's advocate" was a high-ranking
official in the Roman Catholic Church responsible for arguing the case
against a candidate for sainthood (or canonization.) In essence, he was taking the
Devil's position on the candidate, and thus fighting on the side of pure
evil. Today, I'll be playing the role of devil's advocate to argue
for the case of all of those BDBL GM's who have decided to pack it in
and trade away their superstars in exchange for human lottery tickets, well before they could
ever benefit from the hindsight that is such an enormous advantage in
this game. In other words, I, too, will be fighting on the
side of pure evil.
Because we use last year's MLB stats in this game, a
rebuilding team can take
maximum advantage of that element of our game by waiting as long as
possible before trading away his overpriced and/or free-agent-to-be
superstar. So why is it, then,
that we see so many teams -- year after year after year -- trading away
their best trading chits before Opening Day of the MLB season even
begins? Surely, there must be some rational reason for this, no?
Well, as devil's advocate, it is my duty to list some of these reasons.
- Trading early in the season
ensures the biggest pool of possible bidders for a team's superstar
players. For example, if a team is shopping an ace closer, and
waits until the Chapter Four deadline to trade him, chances are good
that every contending team in need of a closer would have already
filled that hole by then. The fewer teams
bidding on a player, the less market value the player has, and the
less he will fetch in trade.
Of course, "God's advocate" would argue
that if a team waits longer before trading that closer, it's possible
that more teams will enter the bidding, as teams oftentimes don't
make the decision between contending or rebuilding until later in the
season. A team that is on the fence in Chapter One may be more
open to trading part of their future for a key missing ingredient later
in the year. Or, maybe a contending team that has been searching all
year for that ingredient becomes so desperate by the time Chapter Three
comes to an end, that they would be willing to trade even
MORE for that rent-a-player than they would have earlier in the year.
- As the old saying goes, "Buy low,
sell high." It's best to "buy" prospects from a contending
team early in the season, before those prospects blossom into
untouchable superstars. And it is best to sell your
expensive/walk-year superstars early in the season, when they still
have a full season's worth of usage, and thus more value to a
contending team.
The problem with this argument is that
you're trading certainty for risk. If you trade for a player in
February, and that player breaks his arm in March, or doesn't develop as
expected throughout the season, you've basically wasted your biggest
opportunity to improve your team's future. But if you wait until
July to pull the trigger, you basically know what you're getting.
This is what the psychologists would
call "loss aversion," where
avoiding a loss is preferable to acquiring a gain. "Risk aversion"
also plays a huge psychological role in these types of trades, as people
will generally prefer to strike a deal that has huge upside but a much
higher risk, rather than the deal with a more certain upside, but a
lower payoff.
- If a rebuilding team is trading a
superstar who is NOT in his walk year, there is always a risk that
that superstar will suffer through a horrendous year, and will
become untradeable. Best to deal him as early as possible
before you're stuck with an expensive WORS.
Of all the arguments made in favor of
early dumping, this one is probably the best. The worst-case
scenario here is that the superstar player continues to perform at a
superstar level, and is worth every penny of his exorbitant salary the
following year. In which case, the rebuilding team probably ended
up under-selling him. However, when compared to the risk of being
stuck with an overpriced pantload, this is an acceptable trade-off in
most cases.
Of course, in these scenarios, the
rebuilding team pays for their expensive mega-star player up-front. That is money that could have been spent in the
auction/draft on players with upside for the future. So instead of
spreading around $10 million or so on several of these players in the
auction/draft, these teams take a few fliers in trade after the draft is
over. Either way, they're spending $10 million on a bunch of
fliers, hoping that one or more pan out. This strategy may work on
occasion, but it's a real loser in the long run.
Those are about all the arguments I can
think of. So let's take a look at recent history and see how well
these arguments have held up.
Trade:
In March of 2003, Great Lakes traded Aaron Cook and Runelvys Hernandez
to the Kansas Law Dogs for David Wells.
At the time:
Wells was a valuable mid-rotation innings-eater, as he
posted a 3.75 ERA in 206+ MLB innings. Hernandez was making
headlines in spring training by being named Kansas City's Opening Day
starter in just his second year in the big leagues. He began the
previous year in High-A-ball, and posted a stellar 2.71 ERA in Double-A
before a late-season call-up to the bigs, where he posted a respectable
4.36 ERA in 74+ innings. Cook enjoyed a similar meteoric rise,
going from Double-A all the way to a 35+ IP stint in the big leagues the
previous year. In the spring of '03, Cook was ranked as the #41
prospect in baseball by Baseball America.
How it turned out:
Hernandez missed the entire 2004 season after Tommy John
surgery, and hasn't been heard from since. Cook pitched four
seasons for the Law Dogs, going 11-16, with a 5.80 ERA in 232+ innings
in total. Now in the final year of his contract, he was traded to
Corona this past winter along with two others for Billy Wagner. A
few days later, Wagner was flipped in a three-team/six-player deal that
netted Jorge Posada.
Verdict:
Given that it took FIVE YEARS for Kansas to finally benefit from this
deal, it's more than likely that they could have done better if they'd
used hindsight to their advantage and waited a little longer before
trading Wells. But the temptation to add another Royal to the Law
Dogs roster was just too great.
Trade:
In March of 2003, the Oakland Homicide
(now known as the Padawans) traded Ivan Rodriguez, Brian Jordan and Ben
Fritz to the Madison Fighting Mimes (now the Infidels) in exchange for
Francisco Rodriguez, Sean Burnett and Benito Santiago.
At the time:
Just six weeks into his BDBL career, this was the first trade made by
the young rookie GM John Duel. I-Rod was a
big-money ($10.5 million) free agent, signed by the Homicide's former GM in the
league's very first free agent auction. Jordan was a
platoon player (.303/.347/.560 vs. LHP in MLB), playing in his walk
year. And Fritz was one of Oakland's "Moneyball" first round draft
picks in 2002. F-Rod (a.k.a. K-Rod) was a 21-year-old MLB rookie, who was
ranked as the #10 prospect in all of baseball by Baseball America that
spring. Burnett was ranked #25 on that list. And Santiago
was merely a throw-in to replace Rodriguez.
How it turned out:
Well, it couldn't have possibly turned out any better for the
Oakland/Sylmar franchise. In four seasons with the Padawans,
Francisco Rodriguez has compiled a 2.48 ERA through 258 innings, with 20
saves and 333 K's. He's signed through the 2010 season, so the Padawans
will continue to benefit from this trade for many years to come.
Burnett's career has turned out like most top-25 pitchers' careers.
In other words, it's been filled with nothing but injuries and
disappointment. Now 24 years old, Burnett is coming off a Triple-A
season in which he compiled a 5.16 ERA in 120+ innings.
Verdict:
Despite Burnett's burnout, this trade was obviously a big, big winner
for the Sylmar franchise. And there's no question they made the
right decision by pulling the trigger as early as they did. But there were two
factors that were unique to their situation at the time: 1) they were
offered two top-25 prospects for one overpriced player, which was such a
great deal it would have been foolish to wait for something better, and
2) carrying a $10.5 million salary at that point in the franchise's
history made little sense, and dumping that salary gave them some
much-needed wiggle room going forward.
Trade:
In March of 2004, the Silicon Valley CyberSox traded Larry Walker and
Greg Myers to the Stamford Zoots in exchange for Hee Seop Choi and Ben
Petrick.
At the time:
Walker
(.284/.422/.476 in MLB) was in the final year of a two-year, $22 million
contract, and Myers (.307/.374/.502 at MLB, with 822/884 splits) was
playing out the final year of his BDBL career. Choi was the #22
prospect in baseball in 2003 (according to Baseball America), but at 25
years old, he was coming off a season in which he hit just .218 in a
202-at-bat MLB trial. At age 26, Petrick (.259/.333/.500 in 80
Triple-A games in 2003) was no longer considered to be much of a
prospect.
How it turned out:
Choi hit .183/.359/.376 for Silicon Valley in
2004, and .227/.297/.424 in 2005, before he was traded to Marlboro in
the winter of 2006 in exchange for Casey Janssssen. Petrick was
released by the CyberSox two chapters after he was acquired.
Verdict:
As I wrote at the time this trade was
made, the CyberSox would have been much better off if they had waited a
little longer before trading Walker and Myers -- especially if the two
had been traded separately, rather than packaged together. The
motivation for pulling the trigger so quickly on Stamford's offer was in
getting Choi before his value went through the roof. Unfortunately
for Greg Newgard, that never happened.
Trade:
In January of 2005, the Bear Country Jamboree traded Brad Penny to the
Salem Cowtippers in exchange for Kendry Morales.
At the time:
Penny (3.15 ERA in 143 MLB innings) was a $6.5 million purchase by the
Jamboree in the auction -- a purchase Matt Clemm regretted instantly,
given the dire medical reports filtering out of the Dodgers camp that
spring. Morales had just defected from Cuba the previous summer,
and was ranked the #76 prospect in baseball by Baseball America that
winter before he'd even played a single game in the U.S.. It was
felt that he would advance very quickly up the ladder, and may even make
the big league team out of spring training.
How it turned out:
Morales hit .344/.400/.544 in 22 games
at High-A before a quick promotion to Double-A, where he hit
.306/.349/.530 in 74 games. He then hit .320/.359/.520 in Triple-A
last year before a 57-game MLB trial, in which he hit .234/.293/.371.
Verdict:
The jury is still out on this one. Although Morales' star has
faded quite a bit, he still owns a career batting line of .331/.393/.551 in
the minor leagues, and is still just 24 years old. If his name
were "Phil Smith," he'd undoubtedly be regarded as a bright, young,
budding star. But since he dominated Cuban (and world) competition
at the age of 16, we've come to expect more of him. PECOTA is a
little less than enthusiastic about his chances of becoming a star, with
VORP projections of -1.2, 1.9, 4.9, 3.0 and 1.1 over the next five
years. The Jamboree had two good reasons to have an itchy trigger
finger: 1) if Penny's injury cost him the majority of the 2005 MLB
season (as many were predicting), they would have had to pay someone to
take him, and 2) if Morales turned out to be as much of a superstar as
many were predicting, he would have been untouchable later in the year.
Instead, Penny turned out to be relatively healthy, and Morales turned
out to be a bit overhyped. Matt Clemm took a gamble, and (maybe)
lost.
Trade:
In March of 2005, the Cleveland Rocks traded Jason Schmidt and Esteban
Yan to the Wapakoneta Hippos for Cliff Lee, Ryan Dempster, Kyle
Farnsworth and Jason Giambi.
At the time:
Schmidt (3.20 ERA in 225 IP at MLB) was the sixth-best pitcher in
baseball, according to VORP, while Yan was an innings-eating throw-in.
Lee was a 26-year-old with an inconsistent minor league track record, who had compiled a 5.43 ERA (179 IP, 188
H, 81 BB, 161 K) in MLB the previous year. Dempster pitched just
20+ innings in MLB in 2004, and had posted a fugly 6.54 ERA in 115+
innings in 2003. Farnsworth owned a 4.73 ERA in 66+ innings in MLB
'04, and owned a 33/78 BB/K ratio. And Giambi (.208/.342/.379 in
264 ABs) was in the final year of a four-year BDBL contract.
(Note: he was included solely because of the in-season salary cap rule
we had in place at the time.)
How it turned out:
Lee became an
instant BDBL celebrity when he suddenly and inexplicably pulled a career
year out of the depths of his ass in MLB '05. He posted a 3.79 ERA in 202 innings,
and went 11-12
for the Rocks last year, with an ERA of 4.01 in 213+ innings.
Since then, he's been signed to a four-year contract and has fallen back
to earth a bit, settling in as an inexpensive #3/#4 starter. Incredibly, both Farnsworth (2.19
ERA in 70 IP) and Dempster (3.13 ERA in 92 IP) enjoyed miraculous
comeback seasons in MLB '05 as well. Unfortunately, all those
miracle performances failed to help the Rocks reach a .500 record in
2006, as they finished just 71-89 -- 26 games out of first.
Verdict:
I will never understand how he did it
(brilliant scouting and statistical analysis? psychic powers?
magic? witchcraft? Ouija boards? taro cards?
blindfolded dart-throwing?), but Mike Stein was able to pinpoint three
pitchers who completely defied all expectations, forecasts and odds, and enjoyed
once-in-a-lifetime breakthroughs, giving him three low-cost, high-impact
pitchers the following season. So in retrospect, it was a
brilliant
deal for the Rocks, and waiting until later in the season would not have
benefited them in any way. Something tells me that was a
Daffy Duck
trick, though. I'd love to see him do it again.
Trade:
In March of 2005, the Los Altos Undertakers traded Eric Gagne and Mike
Pelfrey to the New Hope Badgers in exchange for Jeremy Hermida, Mike
DeJean and Jeff Bajenaru.
At the time:
Gagne was the most dominant reliever in baseball, and the single
greatest weapon in the league. In 82+ MLB innings, he allowed
just 53 hits and 22 walks, struck out 114, and posted a 2.19 ERA. Pelfrey was considered to be among the top pitchers in college baseball.
Hermida was the #18 prospect in baseball (according to Baseball
America.) DeJean was a minimum-wage middle relief flier, and
Bajenaru was a Triple-A reliever who reportedly threw 100 mph.
How it turned out:
Pelfrey was drafted 9th overall that
June, and is currently ranked as the 20th prospect in baseball (by BBA.)
He was later "sold" back to Los Altos last year, in exchange for Eric Chavez's $10 million
carcass. DeJean compiled a 3.41 ERA in 68+ innings for the
third-place (64-96) Undertakers, and was then released on Cutdown Day.
Bajenaru was released just one chapter after this trade. Hermida
climbed up to #4 on BBA's prospect list in 2006, and hit .251/.332/.368
in an injury-abbreviated rookie year last year.
Verdict:
We won't have enough information to
properly judge this trade until Hermida's career begins to take shape.
At the time of this trade, the biggest knock against Hermida was a lack
of power. Prior to this trade,
he had hit just 16 home runs and 49 doubles in almost 1,000 minor league
at-bats. But right after this trade, he had a breakout year and clubbed 18
homers and 29 doubles in just 386 Double-A at-bats. At just 23
years old, PECOTA sees Hermida evolving into a borderline star player,
with projected VORPs of 24.2 to 27.2 over the next five seasons.
But that assumes he'll be healthy -- which seems to be a big assumption
at this point.
The question is: Could Jeff Paulson have gotten more for Gagne if he'd
just waited a little longer? The fact that he had to pay $10
million a few months later just to re-acquire the "throw-in" he gave up
in this trade tells me that maybe he could have. Then again, with Hermida exploding on the scene in the summer of '05,
maybe Jeff
timed it just right. We won't know for another year or two.
Trade: In February of 2006, the
Ravenswood Infidels traded Johan Santana, Placido Polanco, Ugueth Urbina
and Matt Stairs to the Allentown Ridgebacks for Edwin Encarnacion,
Felipe Lopez, Trot Nixon, Jae Seo, Scott Olsen, George Kottaras and
Richie Robnett.
At the time: Santana (231+ IP, 180 H,
45 BB, 238 K, 2.87 ERA) was perhaps the best pitcher in baseball, and
with the Ridgebacks leading their division with a rotation of Roy Oswalt, Jake Peavy and Felix Hernandez,
adding Santana to that mix seemed to make the Ridgebacks the
favorites to win it all. Polanco (.331/.383/.447) and Lopez
(.291/.352/.486) were pretty much even swaps, as were Urbina (79+ IP,
3.62 ERA) and Seo (90+ IP, 2.59 ERA), and Stairs (.275/.373/.444) and
Nixon (.275/.357/.446). Encarnacion and Olsen were MLB rookies who
were performing well in spring training, and were considered to be
shoo-ins for starting jobs heading into the season.
How it turned out:
Encarnacion enjoyed a decent (.276/.359/.473) rookie season in MLB, and
is currently the starting third baseman for the Infidels at only $100k
in salary. Olsen
(180+ IP, 4.04 ERA) enjoyed a tremendous rookie year, and is currently
installed as Ravenswood's #3 pitcher (also at $100k.) Lopez was later dealt back
to Allentown in a trade that netted Ravenswood's current platoon
shortstop, Jose Valentin (also at $100k.) Seo was later traded for Jamie Moyer and Fausto Carmona. And Kottaras and Robnett are
still members of the
Ravenswood farm. Verdict:
Once again, the GM doing the early dumping did very well for himself.
Potrafka ended up with a starting third baseman, a #3 starter and a
platoon shortstop for the 2007 season -- for $300,000 combined.
Not only will these players help the Infidels this year, but each of
them should produce for many years to come.
So, what have we learned? Even
though it is difficult to present a solid, logical argument for trading
a superstar player before the MLB season even begins, history has proven
that this illogical gamble has paid off more often than not. Out
of the seven trades listed above, teams made the right decision (in
hindsight) three times, the wrong decision twice, and for the other
two, the jury is still out. Of
course, God's advocate would argue that if those teams had just waited
until later in the season, and used hindsight to their advantage, they
would have batted seven-for-seven. But this isn't about God.
This year, more superstar impact players
have been traded before April 1st than at any other time in league
history. Before any hindsight could be gained by the teams doing the
dumping, the following prime trade bait has already been pissed away: Roger Clemens,
Paul Konerko, Jason Giambi, Ivan Rodriguez, Kenny Rogers, David Ortiz,
Mariano Rivera, Chipper Jones and Brian Roberts. Time will tell
whether the Baseball Gods will reward these teams for tossing
aside the biggest advantage this game has to offer, and voluntarily
exchanging certainty for risk. It's a risk that doesn't need to be
taken, and yet it's a risk some GM's just can't resist taking. |