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slant.gif (102 bytes) From the Desk of the Commish

Commish

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July, 2007

Defending the Dump, Revisited

What an exhausting and bewildering year it's been.  Although we've seen fewer trades this season than any other season in league history, a higher proportion of those trades has been completely nonsensical, epic disasters.  It is difficult to remember another time in league history where so many teams benefited so greatly while sacrificing so little.  Time and time again, we've witnessed teams adding significant impact players to their starting rotation, bullpen or lineup without having to exchange anything of value in this or any future season.

Back in April, I did my best to defend the decision to make early dump trades, well before hindsight could be of any benefit to the dumping teams.  In that piece, I listed several trades that were made in recent years, and tried to look at them objectively, using both hindsight and the thought process that probably went into those decisions at the time the trades were made.  Although we usually like to wait a few years before passing judgment on any trade, the trades made earlier this season have been so laughably lopsided, we could easily pass judgment today, and nothing would likely change a year or two from now.

So let's pass some judgment, shall we?


Trade: Last winter, New Milford traded Roger Clemens to Southern Cal for Joel Piniero, Jose Valverde, Brian Schneider, Dioner Navarro and Garrett Anderson.

At the time: Clemens was a $19 million burden on the Blazers' salary cap.  The Blazers were looking at a Draft Day budget of roughly $6 million (according to Blazers' estimates), and trading Clemens freed an additional $9 million in salary.  However, it also freed New Milford from their biggest and most coveted trading chit well before the season even began.  The deal was "centered around Navarro," according to New Milford GM Anthony Peburn, who was ecstatic to get a "young catcher and $9 million" in exchange for Clemens.

How it turned out: After hitting just .244/.316/.342 in MLB '06, Navarro is batting a robust .180/.247/.264 through 178 at-bats.  His career averages now stand at .240/.316/.335 through 629 at-bats, so this year's performance has been hardly surprising.  Given that his BDBL option year has expired, New Milford will either have to sign him long-term this winter or release him.  Either way, it's a no-win situation.  With their extra $9 million in spending money, New Milford was able to afford both Kenny Rogers ($10.5 million) and Chipper Jones ($8.5MM) in the free agent auction.  More on those players below.

Verdict: Had the Blazers used hindsight to their advantage, and waited to pull the trigger on Clemens, they undoubtedly would not have traded for Navarro, and they would have had to live without Rogers or Jones.  Had they held onto Clemens, there's no telling what they may have received in return for him this season.  But whatever it would have been, it's hard to imagine it could have been less than what they got.  Verdict: New Milford should've waited.


Trade: During the draft, New Milford traded Chipper Jones to Nashville for Akinori Iwamura, Yoslan Herrera, Hong-Chi Kuo and David Dellucci.

At the time: New Milford shelled out $8.5 million for Jones, out-bidding the Marlboro Hammerheads (who submitted an $8MM bid) and Allentown Ridgebacks ($8.5MM) to get him.  They immediately put him on the block, and within days traded him for the package above.  Iwamura and Herrera were both coming to the U.S. from foreign countries (Japan and Cuba, respectively), and neither had played a single game in MLB.  Kuo was an old friend of the Blazers organization, who'd been dealt in the massive Jason Bay trade of 2006.  And Dellucci was acquired merely as filler for a team unlikely to win more than 50 games in 2007.

How it turned out: Iwamura missed a month with a strained oblique, then was hit in the eye and missed a handful of games in late May.  In between the various ailments, he's hit .311/.413/.481.  Like most Japanese hitters, the power he displayed across the Pacific has disappeared (just 1 HR and 8 XBH a week ago, but 6 XHB in the past 6 games), but he's hit enough singles and (surprisingly) drawn enough walks to be of some use.  Herrera (5.58 ERA in 59+ IP at AA) has been a spectacular failure, and has already been released by the Blazers.  Kuo (27 IP, 29 H, 2 HR, 11 BB, 24 K, 6.33 ERA) has continued a career-long pattern of failure, injury, tons of walks and tons of Ks.  And Dellucci was later jettisoned as part of a seven-player deal that netted Adam Lind.

Verdict: Would the Blazers make this trade today, knowing what they know about Iwamura, Herrera, Kuo and Dellucci?  Maybe, maybe not.  Those four players certainly aren't worth $8.5 million combined next year.  And it's questionable whether they'll ever be worth that much, given Iwamura's age and Kuo's injury history.  Without question, that money could have been spent more wisely.  Verdict: New Milford shouldn't have acquired Jones in the first place.  But given that they did, they should have waited to trade him, given what they ended up getting in return.


Trade: During the draft, New Milford traded Kenny Rogers, Yhency Brazoban and Jerry Hairston to Cleveland for Miguel Batista, Melvin Mora, Kyle Farnsworth and Kevin Kouzmanoff.

At the time: New Milford forked over a whopping $10.5 million for the 42-year-old Rogers, with the sole intention of trading him.  Within minutes of signing him, the Blazers did just that, essentially spending $10.5 million on Kevin Kouzmanoff and a package of mediocre veterans.  At the time, Kouzmanoff was considered to be a good prospect, who was expected to compete for an MLB job in spring training, though he didn't rank on Baseball America's top-100 list.

How it turned out: Again, the question here is: could that money have been better spent?  And the answer is: of course.  For $10.5 million, the Blazers could have purchased several mediocre vets, and traded each one for fliers like Kouzmanoff.  Or, they could have rolled the dice on underappreciated players in the draft.  Or, they could have signed a free agent whom they actually intended to keep.  They could have done any number of things with $10.5 million, really.  But they blew their load on one player, then traded him for, essentially, one rookie -- a rookie who is hitting .221/.286/.374 so far this MLB season.  Of the vets, Batista and Mora are both free agents after this season, and New Milford has yet to find a taker for either.  Farnsworth was later traded (along with Miguel Cairo) for the spectacular duo of Renyel Pinto (4.59 ERA in 33+ IP in MLB) and Ben Zobrist (.159/.156/.222 in 63 ABs in MLB.)

Verdict: What a waste of money.  The Blazers essentially spent $10.5 million on three completely useless players for 2008.  It's still up in the air how much Kouzmanoff will be worth down the road, but it's doubtful he'll ever be a $10.5 million player.  The flip side to the "should they have waited for hindsight?" argument is that the player the dumping team is trading could lose his value the longer they wait.  And that certainly has been the case here, as Rogers has yet to throw a pitch in MLB, and will likely be a huge burden to the Rocks next season.  So, the verdict here is that New Milford made the right move by trading Rogers when they did, but they made an enormous blunder by acquiring him in the first place.
 


Trade: Before Opening Day, Marlboro traded David Ortiz to New Hope for Jason Giambi, Shane Victorino and Shaun Marcum.

At the time: Within minutes of signing Ortiz to a $10.5 million salary in the auction, a panic-stricken Shark placed him on the trading block.  And minutes after that, this trade was consummated.  Since Giambi is in his walk year, he was acquired solely for the purpose of trading as well.  According to Sharky's press release at the time, "Getting back Giambi to platoon with Garciaparra gives us similar production.  We also get [much-needed] young hitting with switch-hitter Victorino (who will be the starting RF in Philly) and a flier on Toronto's fifth starter next year.  This deal basically gives us similar offensive production this year at 1B without the commitment next year."

How it turned out: Well...needless to say, Giambi's and Ortiz's production in the BDBL this season has been anything but similar.  In fact, no hitter in the history of baseball (real or imagined, MLB or Little League) has ever put up numbers anywhere near Ortiz's.  Giambi was later traded (see below.)  Victorino has hit .273/.341/.402 so far.  He's on pace for 15 homers and 48 stolen bases.  And Marcum has enjoyed a shockingly effective season, posting a 3.38 ERA in 64 innings, with 62 Ks.

Verdict: Although it looks like Marlboro received two cheap and decent players in this trade (though both need to keep up this pace through the second half), just imagine what they could have received if they had held onto Ortiz.  Imagine what a contending team would be willing to trade to add a MONSTER bat with a 1300+ OPS to the middle of its lineup.  I know what I would give, and it's far more than Victorino and Marcum, I can tell you that.  Verdict: At the very least, Sharky should have waited long enough for some other team to make an offer for Ortiz.  Accepting the very first bid to show up in his in-box was probably not the wisest decision.


Trade: Just days after handing the Badgers the most valuable player in the history of the league, Marlboro traded the best reliever in the league (Mariano Rivera) to New Hope in exchange for Daniel Cabrera, James Loney and Chad Paronto.

At the time: Rivera is in his walk year, so there was no rush to trade him.  (Or, at least, there shouldn't have been.)  Cabrera was a perennial disappointment to those who expected that his high-90's fastball, groundball tendencies and occasional brilliance would translate into a "breakthrough year" at some point in his career.  Loney posted good numbers in the minor leagues, but was a man without a position in the big leagues.  And Paronto was a $2 million middle reliever who was probably acquired to offset the difference in VORP.

How it turned out: Needless to say, Rivera has been lights-out for the Badgers, as expected, and is a big reason why they sport the second-best record in the BDBL.  To the surprise of no one but Sharky, Cabrera's career-long awfulness has continued into the 2007 MLB season.  Through 97 innings, he has allowed 14 homers and 46 walks, and has posted a 5.20 ERA.  His contract, which pays him $5.2 million through the 2009 season, is now a burden Marlboro must carry.  Loney finally got the call on June 7th, and managed 15 at-bats before crashing face-first into a wall.  He's played 10 games in the big leagues now, and is hitting .429/.448/.821 in 28 at-bats.  Paronto has posted a 4.88 ERA through 27+ innings, with more walks than strikeouts, and will undoubtedly be released on Cutdown Day.

Verdict: Had Marlboro waited until the MLB season began, it's doubtful they would have taken a flier on Cabrera.  In retrospect, just getting rid of that contract made this a tremendous trade from New Hope's perspective -- never mind the fact that they also got Rivera "thrown-in."  Loney is now an outfielder, which means he'll have to hit much better than he did in the minors to become an asset to the Hammerheads.  It could happen, but if Sharky had to make this decision over again, something tells me he would pass.  Therefore, the only logical verdict here is that he should have waited.


Trade: Prior to Opening Day, Chicago sent Ivan Rodriguez and Kurt Suzuki to the Manchester Irish Rebels in exchange for Yovani Gallardo, Adam Loewen and Jarrod Saltalamacchia.

At the time: Manchester GM Jim Doyle was so delusional, he thought his team was one aging, overrated catcher away from winning the division.  And he was willing to trade three of the top young players in the game to acquire that missing piece of the puzzle.

How it turned out: Well, I-Rod has hit a whopping .253/.301/.402 for the Rebs, who limped into the all-star break with a 36-44 record -- 9 games behind in the division.

Verdict: If you're going to trade away a star impact player early in the season, well before hindsight can be of any benefit to you, you had better get so much talent in return that the offer is simply too good to refuse.  This was one of those offers.  Needless to say, Chicago did the right thing by making this trade when they did.  If I were in the middle of a pennant race, and someone offered me those three players for my starting catcher, I think I'd pull the trigger.  Some offers are just too good to pass up no matter what position your team is in.  Even though Loewen is out for the year, this is still a trade that can benefit the Black Sox franchise for YEARS to come.


Trade: During the draft, Allentown traded David Eckstein and Robb Quinlan to the Corona Confederates for Ryan Braun and Tom Martin.

At the time: Corona GM Ed McGowan felt that Eckstein was the missing ingredient his team needed to win the Butler Division.

How it turned out: We've given Ed enough grief over this trade already, so I won't beat this dead horse anymore.

Verdict: This trade doesn't even really fit into the category of "early-season dump trade."  In those types of trades, the team doing the dumping is sacrificing a star player with impact value.  But in this case, we're talking about David Eckstein.  Poor Ed is going to regret this trade for a long, long time.


Trade: At the end of Chapter One, the SoCal Slyme traded Roger Clemens and Paul Konerko to the Kansas Law Dogs for Ted Lilly, Adam LaRoche, Chris Shelton, Wil Ledezma and Adam Jones.

At the time: The Slyme were a first-place team, despite having not pitched Clemens at all in Chapter One.  They figured they didn't need him, so they traded him while his value was still seemingly at its peak, getting a couple of replacement arms in exchange.  Why Konerko was included was a mystery, but the Sylvester family's theory at the time was that LaRoche and Shelton combined could match the offensive production of Konerko.

How it turned out: Clemens owns a 5-0 record with a 2.66 ERA in 61 innings for Kansas.  Ledezma and Lilly own a 5-5 record with a 5.48 ERA in 69 innings for SoCal.  Konerko has created 28.9 runs in 143 PAs for Kansas.  LaRoche and Shelton have created 58.8 runs in 255 PAs for SoCal.  The Slyme are now six games behind in the Person Division.

Verdict: This isn't your typical "dump" trade, because both teams claim they were making the trade to improve their teams this year.  In that respect, the Slyme seem to have replaced Konerko's bat (58.8 RC vs. a prorated 51.5 RC), but not Clemens' arm.  If the Slyme hadn't made this trade, would they be any closer to first place?  Probably, though it's hard to say for sure.  One unexpected twist to this whole saga is the fact that Lilly (92+ IP, 79 H, 12 HR, 18 BB, 82 K, 3.90 ERA) is having such a tremendous season in MLB, and is signed through the 2009 season at only $5MM in total salary.  If the Slyme were unconcerned about competing this year, Lilly's acquisition would make this a great trade, in retrospect. While Ledezma (4.78 ERA in 37+ IP, signed through '08), LaRoche (.211/.306/.366, signed through '10) and Shelton (demoted back to the minors, signed through '09) have done nothing to warrant their contracts, Jones has been swinging a red-hot bat in the minors, and may become a real asset in '09 or '10.  One would hope, however, that a first-place team wouldn't be looking toward next year (never mind '09 or '10.)  And if so, one would hope that they wouldn't be putting all their eggs into Ted Lilly's basket, well before Opening Day of the MLB season had even begun.  Verdict: On many different levels, the Slyme would have been better off waiting.


Trade: In mid-March, Marlboro traded Jason Giambi and Ryan Tucker to Manchester for Ty Wigginton and Andrew McCutchen.

At the time: Determined to make ALL of his trades for the entire season before the Ides of March, Sharky Kaminski traded his final big trade chit, roughly three weeks before Opening Day of the MLB season.  In exchange, he received top-25 prospect McCutchen and the $4.5 million Wigginton.

How it turned out: McCutchen got off to a horrendous start, hitting just .189/.247/.311 in the month of April.  He followed that up with an equally-horrendous May (.230/.307/.407) and June (.250/.305/.295).  Meanwhile, Wigginton is hitting .280/.326/.479 in MLB, and will probably be released at the end of the year.

Verdict: McCutchen was acquired for the 2009 and 2010 BDBL seasons, so anything he does this year could be termed irrelevant.  But still...would Sharky have made this trade today, knowing how many steps backward McCutchen has taken this year?  Probably not.  Therefore, it was probably wise to wait beyond March 10th to blow his final load of the season.  Sharky's fear was being "stuck" with Giambi, but I offered Carlos Gomez for Giambi just a couple of weeks ago.  I wonder who Sharky would rather own right now: Gomez or McCutchen?


Of the nine trades above, you could make a very good case that seven of them shouldn't have been made, as the teams trading their superstar players should have waited for a little MLB hindsight to benefit them.  These are only the trades that I would consider to be "early" dump trades.  There have been so many awful trades made this season that I could continue this article for another 2,000 words, and I still wouldn't cover them all.  I recently ran a poll on our front page, asking which was the most lopsided trade of the year, and I was astonished how many trades qualified for this distinction.  (The Eckstein trade won that poll, but that was before the recent Schilling and Lackey trades.)

The question remains the same as always: Why are there so many AWFUL trades made in the BDBL, year after year after year?  After all, the longer we play this game, aren't we supposed to get better at it?  Quite frankly, some of these trades look like rookie mistakes -- the kind of trades you'd see made by naive 14-year-olds playing in a DMB league for their very first time, while competing against a league full of 15-year DMB veterans.

One explanation is that there are literally zero consequences for making an awful decision in the BDBL.  If a major league owner gives his GM free rein to spend $19 million (per year) on free agents in the off-season, you'd better believe that owner expects to see instant results, either on the field or at the gate.  But a team like the Blazers can spend $19 million this past winter on Kevin Kouzmanoff and Akinori Iwamura, and they suffer no consequences whatsoever.  They get that $19 million back this winter.  And undoubtedly, they'll spend that $19 million on one or two more big-name free agents next winter, who will then be immediately traded for a few more fliers.  Whether or not those fliers pan out really doesn't matter in the end, because the Blazers really haven't lost anything tangible (other than having to endure a few 100-loss seasons...which they've grown used to by now.)

On the flip side, there is little motivation for a contending team to spend top dollar to fill the holes in their roster on Draft Day, knowing that they can fill those holes far more easily through trading.  Why, for example, should Tony Badger have spent $6 million to acquire a closer this past winter?  It was much wiser to spend that money somewhere else and let Sharky foot the bill for that closer on Cutdown Day.  Why should the Nashville Funkadelic spend $8 million to fill that hole at third base, when the Blazers were more than willing to do it for them?  Basically, some teams are getting an additional $6-$15 million to spend at the auction without actually having to spend it!

We've discussed ways of "fixing" this problem in the past, such as requiring a two year contract and a one year no-trade clause for all Type-H free agents.  But would this solution merely delay the inevitable?  Instead of trading Chipper Jones for Aki Iwamura this year, the Blazers' brain trust would simply wait another year.  Or, maybe teams like the Blazers would just stop bidding on free agents completely, and these players would no longer get fair market value each winter.  Either way, it's far from an ideal solution.

A better solution, I believe, is attaching a two-year no-trade clause to ALL Type-H free agents, and upping the required contract length to a minimum of two years.  After all, when is the last time you saw any MLB team sign a free agent, then trade him within the next two years?

This would solve the problem of illegitimate bidding, but it may create another problem by driving down the cost of all free agents.  So I would attach a "rider" to this bill, stating a change in the way we bid for free agents.  Instead of an "e-Bay"-style bidding format, where the winning bid is always $500K more than the next-highest bid, I suggest we move to a straight (or "silent") auction, where the winning bid is simply the bid submitted by each team (with current tie-breakers remaining.)  This solution would likely put an end to the "one-year superteam" strategy we witnessed last winter, where teams were willing to sacrifice their 2008 season to win it all in 2007, and threw their money away accordingly.

Granted, no solution is likely to ever solve all the problems in this league.  But some solutions may get us closer to our goal of having the "perfect" DMB league.  And as long as those solutions exist, they should be seriously considered.

Normally, at this time of year, I run a "Peter Gammons" article filled with trade rumors heading into the final trading deadline of the season.  But this year, I just don't see a lot of trades happening.  I often say that some of the best trades I've made are the trades I didn't make.  But this year, it seems like some of the worst trades made were the ones that weren't made.  For whatever reason, several contending teams seem content to just sit back and ride out the season without making any effort to improve.

I am consistently amazed to see how little market value top ace pitchers have had on the trade market this season.  After all the ridiculous panic-spending we witnessed this past winter, I expected there to be a feeding frenzy for ace pitchers on the trade market this year as well.  Instead, there has been so little demand for these pitchers, and so few teams entering the bidding wars for them, that ace pitchers have been sold for pennies on the dollar.

How does a pitcher like C.C. Sabathia go for $20 million on the open market in January, and yet much better pitchers go on that same market in February, March and April and receive so little in return?  The teams that have traded these pitchers all have the same excuse: "We put [fill in the blank] on the Selling forum, and only got two offers.  And one of them was completely insulting, so we took the other one."

And my response is always the same: a) if you don't like an offer, make a counter-offer, b) if you don't like ANY of the offers, then wait another six weeks and see if a better offer comes along, and c) don't sit back lazily and wait for offers to come to you; be proactive and put together some offers yourself!

That said, I can't help but wonder why so many contending teams have sat back all season without making any real effort to acquire some of these arms.  You want me to name names?  Okay.

The Wapakoneta Hippos are in the midst of a real battle, tied for first place in their division.  They have a pitching staff that owns a 4.86 ERA, their ace is Brad Radke, and they're actually using Mark Buehrle and Mark Hendrickson every fourth day.  Why on earth wouldn't Bobby Sylvester jump on ANY trade possibility to acquire ANY starting pitcher of ANY value?  With Matt Holliday, Colby Rasmus, Dave Bush, Joba Chamberlain, Tom Gorzelanny, Deolis Guerra and Andrew Miller, the Hippos certainly have enough trade bait to match the offers that were accepted above.

The Hippos are in a battle for the division with the Nashville Funkadelic, who are trotting out Nate Robertson (5.70 ERA in the BDBL) to the mound every fourth game.  Surely, they could use one of the pitchers above, no?  And with Josh Hamilton, Daisuke Matsuzaka, Pat Neshek, David Price and others, they may have even more trade bait to offer than Wapakoneta.

How about the Akron Ryche, who were also locked into a tie for first at the all-star break?  With Javier Vazquez sporting a 5.00+ ERA and Tim Corcoran (4.50) taking the ball every fifth game, you'd think they could use an arm to put them over the top and give them an edge over their Ohio rivals.  Instead, they've decided to stand pat and hold onto all their prime trade bait (such as Stephen Drew and...er...Stephen Drew.)

The Chicago Black Sox trail in that division by just one game.  They own a whopping 5.83 ERA.  And NO ONE owns as much trade bait as Chicago (Evan Longoria, Fernando Martinez, Dustin Pedroia, Felix Pie, Billy Rowell, Jarrod Saltalamacchia, Travis Snider, Mike Bowden, Yovanni Gallardo, etc., etc., etc., etc..)  Why haven't they stepped up and made an offer for one of the above?

In conclusion, there are several factors to blame for all the atrocious trading we've seen this year:

1. Non-contenders who are too panic-stricken to hold onto their most marketable players for more than a week and grab the "best offer available" simply out of fear of being "stuck" with those players, and too lazy to proactively seek better offers on the market.

2. Contending teams who are too satisfied with mediocrity to sacrifice any of their young players to improve their teams this year.

3. A playoffs system that is so random, no one wants to sacrifice any future contending seasons on the premise of improving their chances of winning it all this year.

4. A rules system that makes it too easy for non-contenders to trade away their biggest assets without getting anything of value in return.

In addition to the rules suggestion I made above, having a permanent bonus/penalty structure in place would go a long way toward simulating the long-term approach and accountability MLB GMs have in their jobs.  While no rules change will ever stop awful trades from happening, at least these changes would make the offending GMs more accountable for their actions.