From the Desk of the Commish

-- Bill James in his Historical Baseball Abstract,
referring to the 1961 NL Champion Cincinnati Reds.

In the last one hundred years, only one Major League GM has ever transformed his team through a series of trades and acquisitions from a laughingstock into a champion in the span of only one year. Yet in only three BDBL seasons, we've witnessed this event no fewer than six times. And if the predictions of the BDBL press and our league web polls are accurate, we'll see three more teams (Allentown, Phoenix and New York) do the same by the end of this season.

How can this happen? If the BDBL is designed to mimic Major League Baseball as accurately and realistically as possible, how can so many teams climb from the bottom of the gutter to the top of the heap - all within twelve months time - when this never (or hardly never) happens in the big leagues? To find the answer, let's look at these six past success stories, plus the three new success stories of the 2002 season, and see how they did it.

In 1999, the Cavaliers lost 98 games and finished in last place in the Higuera Division. The following season, the same team (now known as the Phoenix Predators) won 84 games, winning the Eck League wild card. How did they do it? Two words: Pedro Astacio.

The Cavaliers ranked 8th in the Eck League in runs scored in 1999, and 9th in 2000, so the explanation for improvement can't be found offensively. On the mound, the team went from 11th in the league in runs allowed to 4th. And the prime reason, quite simply, was Pedro Astacio:

The numbers in the table above represent all pitchers on the Virginia/Phoenix pitching staff other than Astacio. As you can see, there was little change in the performance of these pitchers. So of the 25 positions on the Phoenix Predators roster, the one and only position that improved dramatically over that one year span was the team's #1 starter. One look at Astacio's stats from these two seasons leaves you scratching your head:

MLB	W-L	ERA	IP	H/9	HR/9	BB/9	K/9
1998	13-14	6.23	209.1	10.5	1.7	3.2	7.3
1999	17-11	5.04	232.0	10.0	1.5	2.9	8.1
BDBL	W-L	ERA	IP	H/9	HR/9	BB/9	K/9
1999	9-21	6.17	214.1	9.8	1.5	3.8	6.7
2000	18-6	3.45	227.0	8.6	0.8	2.8	7.2

Will the real Pedro Astacio please stand up? Other than wins and ERA, Astacio's Major League stats from 1998 and 1999 were nearly identical. In 1999, he had slightly better command, which resulted in a much lower ERA (which was dramatically overinflated in 1998 based on his peripheral stats.) But in the BDBL, his 1999 numbers were barely better - and in some cases worse - than the numbers he posted while pitching half his games in Coors Field in 1998. It's almost as if the Diamond Mind software forgot to take ballpark factors into consideration that year. It was a much different story in 2000, as you can see.

Of course, Astacio wasn't the only reason for the Predators' success in 2000. The following factors also contributed:

Put it all together and you've got a winner. One year later, though, after Astacio had been traded straight-up for Dmitri Young, Phoenix was back in the Higuera Division cellar, losing 106 games. Call it "The Petey Curse."

The Black Sox are the only franchise (so far) to go from 100 losses in one year to 100 wins in the next. Chicago lost 101 games in 1999, then won the Eck League championship in 2000 after finishing the regular season with a then-record 106 wins. How did they do it? By nearly turning over their entire roster through trades and free agent acquisitions.

1999		2000
DeShields	53.7	Cedeno	104.4
A.Jones	83.4	A.Jones	102.6
Alou/Huskey	111.4	Garciaparra	125.6
Salmon/Merced	88.4	Ramirez/Mondesi	155.2
McGriff/Erstad	127.5	Delgado	133.6
Ripken	65.6	Rolen/Ripken	150.1
S.Alomar/Oliver	25.8	Hundley/Santiago	90.6
Ordonez/Gutierrez	54.6	Velarde	111.3
Total Runs Created	610.4	Total Runs Created	973.4

It's hard to believe all of that was done in just one year. Chicago was able to do what no Major League team has ever done, quite simply, because they were able to make trades that no Major League team has ever made.

Garciaparra was acquired from the Phoenix Predators in exchange for Miguel Tejada and Michael Barrett. This is a trade that you will never see at the Major League level. While established superstars like Ken Griffey, Jr., Randy Johnson and Mark McGwire do get traded, and have been traded for young prospects in past Major League seasons, the one common denominator between those superstars is that they were all approaching the final years of their contracts. Garciaparra, on the other hand, had just completed his option year in the BDBL, and could have been signed for as many years as desired. No Major League team ever has, and likely ever would, trade such a player. Phoenix saved $4 million in the first year after this trade, but Chicago gained an instant #3 hitter and MVP candidate, while filling the toughest position to find quality players, for years to come.

In the winter of 2000, Chicago traded the aging Fred McGriff and closer Troy Percival to the Minneapolis Haymakers in exchange for Carlos Delgado. Again, this is a trade you will never see at the Major League level because Delgado was, like Garciaparra, a superstar in the prime of his career who was available to be signed for as long as the Black Sox desired. Major League teams simply don't trade players like that, no matter how badly they need to cut salary or fill a role like closer.

Ramirez was acquired as a result of two trades, both as unlikely as you'll ever find at the big league level. First, Chicago traded the eventual league MVP, Moises Alou, and three other players to the California Storm in exchange for rookie phenom Rick Ankiel. This trade was unrealistic because players like Ankiel - for reasons that may or may not have validity - are simply never traded at the big league level (despite the fact that Ankiel has now been traded five times in the BDBL.)

In the middle of their historic 2000 season, when the Black Sox had already sealed the division title, Ankiel was traded again, along with three others, to the Kansas Law Dogs in exchange for Manny Ramirez. Ramirez had a phenomenal season for Chicago while Ankiel's career took a bizarre turn toward oblivion that fall, making this look like runaway steal for Chicago. This second Ankiel trade was a bit more realistic than the first because Ramirez, unlike the injured Alou, was an established superstar in the prime of his career. Whether or not this trade was realistic or wise for the Chicago franchise's future, it was definitely helpful to the 2000 Black Sox.

With the acquisitions of those big three and the improvements of Randy Velarde, Andruw Jones and Todd Hundley, Chicago went from being ranked dead-last in the entire BDBL in runs scored to setting a BDBL record in that category in the span of only one year.

The Black Sox also made great improvements on the mound, where they went from 10th place in the Eck League in runs allowed to first-place despite a significantly more error-prone defense that committed 38 more errors in 2000 than the year before. The big difference in the 2000 staff was replacing Lance Dickson's 99 innings in 1999 (6.05 ERA) with Al Leiter's 120 innings in 2000 (4.74 ERA.) Leiter was Chicago's other big mid-season pick-up, acquired at the expense of Kelvim Escobar and Donnie Sadler from the Manchester Irish Rebels. Of the five major trades made by the Black Sox in 1999/2000, this was the most realistic of them all, as Leiter was an overpriced starter in the final year of his contract, and Escobar and (in his own way, I suppose) Sadler were both up-and-coming youngsters with potential. But the ironic part about this trade was that Escobar - the more promising of the two players acquired in this deal - was released by the Irish Rebels prior to the draft, making this a Leiter-for-Sadler trade, which is not realistic at all.

Prior to the 2000 season, Chicago acquired another $10 million franchise player in Scott Rolen, but parted with big-time prospect Troy Glaus. Rolen split time with incumbent third baseman Cal Ripken at third, and together, the two of them had a monster season. Although Rolen was yet another young superstar in the prime of his career, signed to a long-term deal by Chicago, I'm sure that is one trade Chicago would like to have back.

Usually when a team goes for broke, they do go broke the year after that. In an effort to win today at any cost, they trade away their best players and/or prospects in exchange for immediate, short-term production. The Black Sox were able to trade for players like Delgado, Rolen, Garciaparra and Ramirez, who were all in the prime of their careers, all signed to long-term deals. As a result, Chicago won 106 more games last year, and if not for some freak injuries and off-years would be on their way to winning 100 more this year.

The North Mankato Mudhens went 62-98 in the inaugural season of the BDBL. Bobby Sylvester then took over, moved the team to Kentucky and to a new division, and improved by 25 wins, taking home both the Person Division title and bragging rights in the Sylvester household. How did he do it? By a series of fiscally-intelligent pre-season trades, one prescient pick-up inherited from the prior regime and one historical farm free agent pick-up by the Kentucky GM's father.

Just before the year-end trading deadline in 1999, new GM Bobby Sylvester pulled off a trade with the Los Altos Undertakers where he acquired Richie Sexson (along with Brad Fullmer) in exchange for Mo Vaughn. During the winter of 2000, Kentucky traded Eric Milton, Jason Varitek and Jeff Cirillo to Salem in exchange for Omar Daal, Doug Brocail, Joe Randa and Robb Nen. Kentucky also made an even swap of salary with Minneapolis, trading $1 million Jeffrey Hammonds for $1 million Ronnie Belliard (plus $500,000 Eric Owens.)

Below is a comparison of the hitters who were traded and received by Kentucky prior to the 2001 season:

Players Traded	AB	Avg	OBP	SLG	OPS	Salary
Vaughn	523	.291	.380	.535	915	$5m
Cirillo	646	.283	.359	.450	809	$5m
Hammonds	310	.245	.304	.429	733	$1m
Players Received	AB	Avg	OBP	SLG	OPS	Salary
Randa	633	.327	.365	.455	820	$100k
Belliard	417	.309	.380	.484	864	$1m
Owens	334	.284	.341	.407	748	$500k
Sexson	282	.280	.331	.585	916	$2m

Milton (16-10, 3.93 ERA) and Daal (14-7, 3.58) enjoyed similar success in 2001, though Milton's salary was $3 million lower than Daal's. All in all, the Fox saved nearly $5 million with these trades, all while getting equal or higher production value. They then used that $5 million to purchase Paul Konerko in the free agent draft. And after posting MVP-type numbers (.366/.433/.656) in the first two chapters of the 2000 season, Konerko was shipped off to the Los Altos Undertakers in exchange for Sean Casey, who hit .347/.412/.561 the rest of the way.

Reason number two for Kentucky's rise to the top of the standings was the risky acquisition of Mike Sweeney in the Inaugural Draft by the franchise's former GM, Chris Kaufman. At the time, Sweeney had only 691 career at-bats and a career OPS hovering right around 700, so spending $2 million on him was a bit of a risk. But Kaufman saw something in Sweeney that prompted him to pass up on immediate need in favor of the future of his franchise that he would never see. Sweeney was enjoying a monster year for Kentucky (.345/.412/.549) in 2001 before he, too, was shipped off mid-season.

The Fox went from being ranked 7th in the league in runs scored to 5th, and 11th in runs allowed to 3rd. A major reason for the latter was the mid-season 1999 acquisition of Tim Hudson as a farm free agent by Bobby's father, who was playing interim GM for the Fox. Hudson's impact on the Fox was immediate and highly significant, as it gave the team an invaluable ace for the playoffs. Hudson went 12-4 with a 2.70 ERA in 136 innings for Kentucky and finished third in the EL Cy Young Award balloting.

Oddly enough, Kentucky probably would have won even more games than they did in 2000 had they stopped trading on Opening Day. When Sweeney was dealt to the South Carolina Sea Cats for Chris Widger, Kent Bottenfield and Billy Koch, he was replaced behind the plate by a combination of Widger (for only 58 at-bats) and Todd Greene (.242/.280/.441 on the season) - a decision that probably cost the Fox 40 runs and four extra wins. Bottenfield (3-5, 6.02) was horrendous for the Fox, and Koch only managed to pitch 17 innings in ten games - hardly significant enough to make up for those 40 lost runs.

Of all the teams to go from last-place to first in one year, the Swamp Rats have to be the most unlikely of all. Gillette finished with a record of 68-92 in 2000, good for third place in the division. During that miserable 2000 season, they didn't make one trade to improve themselves for the following year, and their free agent acquisitions during the year included the likes of Andy Sheets, Geoff Blum, John Wehner, Adrian Hernandez and Craig Counsell (who was later released.) They made just two trades before the 2001 season. They traded their #2 pick to Stamford for Angel Pena (who was released before Opening Day), middle reliever Bobby Chouinard (who pitched just 28 innings for the Swamp Rats) and a #2 pick that wasn't used. They also traded Melvin Mora to Cleveland for Mike Trombley, who racked up a 5.18 ERA over 73 innings in 2001.

Despite an off-year by $10 million franchise player Juan Gonzalez, the Swamp Rats offense remained steady, ranking ninth in runs scored in both 2000 and 2001. The big improvement was in their pitching staff, which went from eighth in runs allowed to fourth despite the off-years by their staff aces Andy Ashby and Jose Lima. The top five Gillette starters in terms of innings combined for a 4.61 ERA in 2001, compared to a 5.09 ERA for the top five starters in 2000. Despite a noticeable decline in his Major League stats, Ashby's ERA improved from 4.59 to 4.26. Lima was replaced in the rotation by Rolando Arrojo, who led the Gillette starting staff in ERA at 4.08 - 1.55 runs lower than his Major League ERA which included 19 starts as a member of the Rockies. Paul Abbott (4.57) and mid-season acquisition Chuck Finley (4.46) were vast improvements on Scott Karl (5.55) and Mike Oquist (5.22). But John Burkett was even lousier in 2001 (6.12) than he was in 2000 (5.79).

Although closer Jeff Nelson made noise by breaking the BDBL single season saves record in 2001, the Gillette bullpen wasn't much better than it was the year before. Their top five relievers in terms of innings posted a 3.95 ERA over 333 innings in 2000 compared to a 4.20 ERA over 358 innings in 2001. Basically, the only area where the 2001 Swamp Rats were an improvement over the 2000 version was their starting rotation, which improved itself by only about half a run per game.

So how on earth did the Swamp Rats go from 90 losses to 90 wins in one season without improving themselves in any significant way? Well...believe it or not, they may have just been lucky.

Given their differential between runs scored (788) and runs allowed (769), the Swamp Rats should have won 82 games last year - 15 less than they actually did win. That differential between expected and actual runs led the BDBL last season, barely edging out the Litchfield Lightning, who won 13 more than expected. One reason for this huge differential is that Gillette won more one-run games (33) than any other team in the BDBL.

The Swamp Rats also benefitted from their schedule, which included interleague games against the Higuera Division. Although the EL champion came out of that division, it also included two teams with more than 100 losses and a .442 division winning percentage that was the lowest in the BDBL. Gillette thrived in those sixteen interleague games, winning fifteen of them.

Give the Swamp Rats a .500 record in one-run games and a .500 record in interleague play and they would have been just as bad in 2001 as they were in 2000. There's a reason why we actually go through the trouble of playing out the season instead of simply awarding the trophy to the best team on paper, and the 2001 Gillette Swamp Rats are a prime example of why we do this.

The Sea Cats had the second-worst record in the BDBL in 2000, but managed to win the Person Division championship just one year later by winning 30 more games than the year before. They made only one significant trade prior to the 2001 season, acquiring Mike Sweeney from the Kentucky Fox in exchange for Chris Widger, Kent Bottenfield and Billy Koch. They also acquired a draft pick from the Manchester Irish Rebels, which they used to select Roger Clemens. But if you add Sweeney and Clemens to a 62-win team, that's not enough to win a division title. Obviously, they needed a little more help than that.

The benefit of losing 98 games is that you get one of the first picks of the free agent pool the following season. In South Carolina's case, they received two of the first three picks of the draft. Aside from Clemens, who went 18-7 with a 3.17 ERA for the 'Cats, South Carolina used their own pick (#2 overall) to select Tom Glavine, who went 20-6 with a 2.70 ERA. Together, Clemens and Glavine carried the Sea Cats to the top ERA in the league. Overall, they ranked second in the Eck League in total runs allowed.

But pitching did not cause the drastic turnaround in fortunes for the 2001 Sea Cats. Even when they lost 98 games in 2000, their pitching staff ranked fifth in runs allowed, so the jump up to second wasn't all that significant. Where they did make vast improvements was on offense. South Carolina ranked dead-last (and 23rd out of 24 BDBL teams) in runs scored in 2000. The main reason for that was a lack of power. No Sea Cats hitter finished with more than 19 home runs in the 2000 season, and they hit just 120 homers as a team (the second-lowest total in the league - one more than the New Milford Blazers.) As a team, they slugged just .386 - the second-lowest percentage in BDBL history.

The acquisition of Sweeney helped quite a bit in that regard. Playing all 160 games of the Sea Cats schedule, Sweeney hit .293/.377/.454 with 27 homers and 105 RBI's. But aside from Sweeney, South Carolina didn't acquire one other significant offensive player through trade or draft between Opening Day of 2000 and Opening Day of 2001. Yet their slugging percentage improved to .475 as a team, and they went from 12th in the league in runs scored to 5th.

The Sea Cats went into the 2000 draft knowing that they were in for a long year. They had some money to spend, but not a lot of talent available to spend it on. So they used two of their $5 million draft picks to select two once-great players who both suffered through brutal off-years, Jim Edmonds and Bobby Higginson. In 204 MLB at-bats, Edmonds hit .250/.339/.426, while Higginson hit .239/.351/.382 in 377 at-bats. Based on numbers alone, neither player was worthy of his $5 million salary.

But the following year, both players enjoyed career years, and the Sea Cats had two players who combined for 91 homers, 164 extra-base hits and 242 RBI's. South Carolina also stuck with the aging Barry Larkin, who bounced back from a sub-par 2000 season to hit .319/.393/.477, and Ray Lankford, who hit .294/.389/.477, and increased his home run total from 12 to 28.

The 2001 Sea Cats prevailed because they were patient, they were smart, they trusted ability over statistics, and they mastered the art of buying low and selling high.

The Ryche went from 95 losses (and a third-place finish) in 2000 to 107 wins and the Hrbek Division championship in 2001. They improved across the board in hitting, pitching and defense:

Year	Runs Scored Rank	Runs Allowed Rank	Unearned Runs	Errors
2000	8	9	93	119
2001	3	1	42	84

The story of the 2001 Akron Ryche began way back in 1999, when the Ryche decided just before the trading deadline to concede the division title and begin building for the future instead. Earlier that year, they traded Rickey Henderson, Rick Reed and Vic Darensbourg to the Delafield Ogres for Eric Davis and Scott Karl. Davis was an MVP candidate at the time, and he continued to post MVP-type numbers for Akron. But when the decision was made to jump ship, Akron shipped off Davis to the eventual league champion Zoots in exchange for Darin Erstad.

At the time, this trade was a huge risk, as Erstad was coming off a horrendous year (.308/.374/.682) in the big leagues. But like the South Carolina Sea Cats, the Ryche placed their emphasis on talent over statistics and the risk paid off big-time when Erstad enjoyed a career year in the Major Leagues the following season. He would be Akron's offensive MVP in 2001, hitting .364/.420/.574 with 40 doubles, 10 triples, 28 homers, 149 runs scored and 124 RBI's, all while playing a gold glove-caliber center field.

The following season, Akron was faced with the same decision of whether to go for broke or build for the future. Once again, they opted to punt, trading Robin Ventura, Ugueth Urbina and Charles Nagy to the Cleveland Rocks in exchange for Ryan Klesko and Adrian Beltre. Klesko hit .306/.430/.547 with 25 homers for Akron in 2001, while Beltre hit a respectable .284/.332/.469 with 42 doubles, 19 homers and 108 RBI's.

But the biggest acquisition the Akron Ryche made in 2000 was their selection of Adam Dunn with the 13th pick of the second round of the farm draft. That pick led to the biggest acquisition in Akron history: Tim Hudson. Hudson became available in the middle of Akron's run toward the 2001 championship, and he was nearly traded to the Stamford Zoots. But at the last moment, Akron stepped in and offered megaprospect Dunn, along with pitcher Jeff Weaver, and the deal was sealed. To top it off, Akron also received Trevor Hoffman in the deal. Hudson would go 6-3 with a 3.94 ERA in 11 starts for Akron. He then won the ELDS MVP with two wins and a 0.66 ERA against the Sea Cats. He was hammered in his first start against the Law Dogs in the EL Championship Series, but allowed only three hits through seven innings in his next start. Unfortunately for Akron, two of those three hits were home runs, and the Law Dogs would win the series with a 4-1 victory in Game Seven.

Another trade that helped Akron in 2001 was the acquisition of Mark Quinn, who hit .338/.396/.580 in 331 at-bats. Quinn was stolen at the bare-minimum cost of two chapters worth of free-agent-to-be Damian Easley in 2000. Two more significant offensive players were acquired in the 2001 draft: John Vander Wal (.325/.443/.589 with 27 HR) in Round 6 and Quilvio Veras (.342/.442/.485 in 307 AB's) in Round 7.

Although the Akron Ryche's rise to the top of the Hrbek Division standings seems sudden, it was really a three-year project achieved through shrewd trading, one bold contract extension and one outstanding farm pick. Of all the teams on this list, the Ryche's rise to the top was probably the most realistic.

Continuing the pattern of the past two seasons, three more teams are threatening to go from worst-to-first in just one year: the Allentown Ridgebacks, Phoenix Predators and New York Knights. Allentown and Phoenix had the worst and second-worst records in the BDBL last season, losing 108 and 106 games, respectively. New York lost 99 games last season, finishing in last place in the Person Division. All three teams are currently hovering near the top of the standings.

Allentown's formula for success has been well-documented. They completely tanked in the second half of last year after trading away all of their star players, including Derek Jeter, Mike Sirotka, Bubba Trammell, Jay Buhner, Steve Kline and Brian Bohanon. Naturally, that led to the worst record in the league, which led to the privilege of having the first pick of this year's free agent crop, which led to the selection of the best pitcher in the league, Randy Johnson.

The Ridgebacks also scored a major victory when they acquired the best hitter on the planet, Barry Bonds, this past winter. As if acquiring the best offensive player in the history of baseball weren't enough, the Ridgebacks also somehow managed to cut salary in the process, dumping $13 million of 2001 salary in the form of Bartolo Colon and Sean Casey (and $29.5 million in future salary from Colon alone) on the hapless (some would say clueless) Litchfield Lightning.

Allentown then scored an amazing trifecta by robbing the Manchester Irish Rebels of their last decent hitter, Manny Ramirez. The Ridgebacks first traded a middle reliever (Joel Piniero) and two bit players (Wil Cordero and Colby Lewis) to Cleveland in exchange for Vladimir Guerrero, then dealt Guerrero to the Irish Rebels for Ramirez. That saved them another $3 million and guaranteed a return engagement from Ramirez next season.

Quite simply, these are three trades that you would never, ever see at the Major League level. No matter how frightened the Giants were of losing Barry Bonds to free agency last season, I'm sure they never gave one moment's consideration to the possibility of trading him for two overpriced players full of question marks about their health and ability. No matter how desperate the Montreal Expos may be to unload another superstar from their roster, you'll never see them trade Guerrero for a middle reliever and two bit players. And no matter how careless Dan Duquette seems to be with the Red Sox payroll, he would never trade a player like Ramirez for a player of equal ability who is making $3 million more and is in his free agent year. These trades just don't happen in real life.

Allentown also benefited greatly from their minor league scouting department, which nabbed Roy Oswalt with the third pick of the 2001 farm draft (a pick they acquired from the Manchester Irish Rebels) and Jimmy Rollins through a seven-player, three-pick trade with the Southern Cal Slyme prior to the 2001 season.

Phoenix's minor league scouting director has been nearly as impressive, bagging Barry Zito with the fourth overall pick of the 2000 farm draft and acquiring Freddy Garcia from the South Carolina Sea Cats in exchange for Carl Pavano during the 2000 season. Offensively, the Predators boosted their hitting attack this past winter by making three trades of varying degrees of realism. Their #1 pick (which they knew would be either Randy Johnson or Mike Mussina) was dealt to Salem in exchange for Bobby Abreu. Given the Predators' depth on the mound and their relative lack of punch at the plate, this was a fairly reasonable trade, although it's hard to come up with a Major League equivalent. Next, Phoenix traded Trot Nixon and their #2 pick to the Stamford Zoots for Phil Nevin and Wascar Serrano. Given the minimal difference between Nixon and Nevin offensively, it's unlikely that you'd see a Major League team make such a trade considering that they'd be assured of signing one of the top free agents available. Lastly, Phoenix traded Raul Mondesi and Aramis Ramirez to Chicago in exchange for Pat Burrell, Roger Cedeno and Michael Barrett. Again, the Predators swapped two similar players in Ramirez and Burrell, so this trade came down to swapping Mondesi for Cedeno and Barrett. Of the three, this trade was probably the most realistic.

The Knights boosted their stock over the winter by acquiring Robert Person and Jose Cruz through trade. Person, a one-year rental, was acquired at the expense of another one-year rental, Chris Carpenter, and prospect Dee Brown. Several others were thrown into the mix as well. All in all, this is probably the type of trade you'd see at the Major League level. Cruz was acquired in a roundabout way at the expense of a #1 draft pick (which turned out to be Roberto Alomar) and prospect Tim Redding. Given the choice, I think most Major League teams would have opted for Alomar and Redding over Cruz.

Aside from those two trades, the Knights roster has changed little since they lost 99 games a year ago. The biggest improvement is staff ace Matt Morris, who was a shrewd pick-up by New York in the sixth round of the 2001 draft. Morris gives the team the ace starter the franchise has never had. Combine that one major improvement with a weakened division and the Knights have found the magic formula for turning it all around in one year's time.

So there you have it. If you find yourself in last place, the formula for getting into first place is simple: